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1 Introduction
Whether policies shape preferences and in which direction is an open question. In one view,
courts serve as “teachers”, telling society what is right or wrong (Caldeira and Gibson 1992). Many
survey experiments are consistent with this view. They document that preferences often conform to
court rulings.1 But many observational studies find the opposite. History provides ample examples of
court decisions stimulating backlash (Post and Siegel 2007; Sunstein 2007; Dolbeare and Hammond
1971; Bartley 1969).2 Formal political economy has tried to explain backlash with two sets of
models. In one literature, laws in strong conflict with prevailing social norms can be ineffective
because whistleblowers do not comply (Acemoglu and Jackson 2014). In another literature, laws
convey information that change the social image of norm-breakers (Benabou and Tirole 2012).
Neither set of models predicts a temporary backlash followed by acceptance known as “thermostatic
effects” in political economy (Ura 2014).
Our model builds on recent theoretical developments on human motivations (Bénabou and
Tirole 2011), where actions respond to two sets of factors, external and internal. External factors are
determined by laws that affect how easy it is to do an act. Internal factors are perceptions that agents
have towards the action. With these two factors, we build a model with steady-state equilibrium.
We show that the internal factor can generate backlash to laws. Agents backlash to counter the
law’s shift in costs to an action. If marginal costs to backlash are high relative to the cost of doing
an action, the change in law will have a sizable positive impact on the share of society choosing
an action. In this case, backlash is temporary. If the marginal costs to backlash are low, then any
change in law can be internalized and this will lead to persistent backlash. The model reconciles
both effects of law documented by prior observational and experimental literature. For example, in
abortion, a 2-year window around Roe v. Wade found immediate backlash by Republicans (Franklin
and Kosaki 1989), but subsequent studies found an increase in abortion support among all groups
(Hanley et al. 2012; Brickman and Peterson 2006). Extending to all Supreme Court cases and to all
1Survey experiments in different legal areas—affirmative action (Clawson et al. 2001), telecom regulation (Clawson
et al. 2001), church-state separation (Unger 2008), health care reform (Christenson and Glick 2015), and gay rights
(Stoutenborough et al. 2006)—corroborate this view. In particular, Zink et al. (2009) found that the more judges
signing onto an opinion or the more precedent there was, the more subjects’ preferences were shaped, regardless of
whether subjects initially agreed with the opinion.
2An exception is Hoekstra and Segal (1996).
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state laws, Ura (2014) and Hernandez (2014) also found a pattern of instantaneous backlash and
immediate decay in backlash within two years. One drawback of the time-series and panel studies
is that policies were not issued randomly for causal inference.
This paper develops causal evidence with Circuit cases, where policymakers are randomly
assigned. Circuit Courts, which make rulings on issues of new law, can change the costs of actions.
An example is a 2014 Fifth Circuit decision that upheld a Texas state law resulting in one-third
of its abortion clinics shutting down. This decision required many women to travel hundreds of
miles to obtain a legal abortion. Lindo et al. (2017) found the increased distance to abortion clinics
resulted in fewer abortions. We develop evidence that state abortion laws are generally affected by
Circuit rulings.
Circuit court rulings establish precedent for jurisdictions of 4-9 states, each of which contain
1-4 federal district courts. Almost all Circuit rulings are final since the Supreme Court hears less
than 2% of Circuit cases. Judges are repeatedly randomly assigned to panels of one in the district
courts and panels of three in the Circuit courts, and the composition of these panels varies by case.
We use the panel composition as an instrument to estimate the causal effects of Circuit rulings. To
interpret out estimates as causal, we assume that the identities of the randomly assigned judges
affect subsequent outcomes through the legal decision alone. This is a reasonable assumption as
newspaper headlines of Circuit Court opinions typically refer to the court and not the identities of
the judges on the panel.3
We leverage the hierarchical setting of two layers of random judge assignment. The two layers
generate a quasi-experiment for the direction of the verdict (based on the Circuit panel assignment)
and the presence of a case (based on the District judge assignment). We estimate different group
responses to rulings (pro- or anti-abortion). For example, we observe if Republicans backlash to pro-
abortion rulings relative to the counterfactual of no-precedent. We analyze all abortion precedents
collected by Sunstein et al. (2006) and Kastellec (2013). We extend the data collection to all abortion
district cases.
In our model, court rulings on state laws affect the costs of taking actions. Consistent with
3Badawi and Chen (2017) also show there is no stock market response to the identity of the judges when their
identities are revealed in Delaware Court of Chancery, which handles corporate disputes and are followed closely by
the markets.
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this assumption for abortion, an extensive empirical literature has examined the impact of state
abortion regulations. They are associated with subsequent fertility (Levine et al. 1999), reproductive
behavior (Klick and Stratmann 2003), child outcomes (Gruber et al. 1999), adult outcomes (Ananat
et al. 2009), and crime (Donohue and Levitt 2001). Abortion access allowed large numbers of women
large numbers of women to delay marriage and motherhood (Myers 2017).4 Many of these studies
use variation in when abortion became legal and find large effects. For example, legalizing abortion
accounted for 25 percentage points of the 31-percentage-point drop in murder between 1991 and
1998. We complement this literature by showing that state abortion regulations are affected by the
Circuit court rulings. This is not surprising when examining the regulations used in prior studies.
In 1970, abortion became legal in five states. But four of the five states are all in one Circuit.
Circuit policymakers are randomly assigned and make different policies in our empirical
framework. Prior research has documented that Democrats vote differently from Republicans in
Circuit Courts (Sunstein et al. 2006).5 Moreover, in the US population, race and religion predict
abortion attitudes (Granberg and Granberg 1980). Consistent with these patterns, a pro-abortion6
precedent becomes more likely with an additional Democrat, white, or secular judge on a 3-judge
panel (by 9%, 17%, or 12%, respectively). Using the quasi-experimental variation in judicial panels,
we find that judge assignment affects subsequent state regulations. Within two years after an anti-
abortion precedent, states within the Circuit are roughly 18% more likely to restrict abortion access.7
The effect appears as a level effect rather than a growth effect.
To measure a shift in perceptions that agents have towards the action, we use both stated
and revealed preferences (charitable donations). We identify 3.5 million charitable donations to
political causes broadly defined as abortion-related. These donations are to causes that might result
in subsequent policies that lower the likelihood of having an abortion (funding of pro-life causes
or pro-life politicians). We find that anti-abortion precedent increases donations to pro-abortion
causes by over 15%. It is worth pausing to show how two layers of judge randomization help unpack
4According to the CDC, roughly one million fetuses are legally aborted in the U.S. every year. For 1,000 live births,
there are 228 abortions, and for every 1,000 women aged 15-44 years, there are 14.6 abortions, in 2010.
5We refer to judges appointed by Democratic presidents as Democrats and those by Republican presidents as Re-
publicans for brevity.
6For expositional purpose, we refer to pro-life, anti-abortion, and anti-choice interchangeably. We do the same for
pro-choice and pro-abortion.
7The dataset on state laws was originally collected by Blank et al. (1996).
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this estimate. This estimate of 15% captures two effects—anti-abortion decisions that increase pro-
abortion donations and pro-abortion decisions that decrease pro-abortion donations. To separate
these two channels, we estimate what would have happened in the absence of a decision. To see how,
our quasi-experiment uses random variation in the direction of the coin flip (assignment of Circuit
judges) and the presence of the coin flip (assignment of District judges). Using this framework,
we find that pro-abortion precedent increases donations to anti-abortion causes – a backlash effect.
Data limitations make it challenging to study whether court decisions activate partisans rather than
affect attitudes among undecided (Green et al. 2004). Consistent with activation of partisans who
shift the size of donations rather than undecided non-donors who start to donate, we find effects on
the size of donations but not the number of donations.
We next examine abortion attitudes using the General Social Survey. It has the advantage of
asking the identical question on abortion attitudes over several decades. It is the only such dataset
and is the same dataset used by prior scholars, which makes for easier comparison. We find that pro-
abortion precedent spurs backlash in attitudes. This effect is pronounced among Republicans, who
sharply antagonize towards abortion. The magnitude of shift is equivalent to the average difference
between Republicans and Democrats. This effect size was also found in an event study of one
Supreme Court ruling, within 1 month (Huq and Mentovich 2015). Backlash effects appear for each
of the abortion reasons surveyed, but are largest for discretionary abortions. This heterogeneity was
also found for one Supreme Court ruling (Roe v. Wade) (Franklin and Kosaki 1989). We reject the
hypothesis of persistent backlash. Both Republican and Democrat abortion attitudes follow legal
precedent after two years. This pattern of instantaneous backlash and immediate decay within two
years matches time-series analyses of Supreme Court precedent (Ura 2014).
Further probing heteregenous effects across different groups, we would like to know if groups
respond to precedents (pro- or anti-abortion) likely perceived as illegitimate or incorrectly decided
relative to the counterfactual of no-precedent. We find that anti-abortion decisions affect Democrats,
while pro-abortion decisions affect Republicans. To put this in quantitative terms, for Republicans,
after a pro-abortion decision, they are 20% more likely to say yes to “Should it be illegal for a
woman to obtain abortion for any reason?” For Republicans, the impact of an anti-abortion decision
is negligible. For Democrats, after an anti-abortion decision, they are 9% less likely to say yes to
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“Should it be illegal for a woman to obtain abortion because the family is poor?” For Democrats,
the impact of a pro-abortion decision is negligible. These patterns echo the different group responses
found for donations in response to pro- or anti-abortion verdicts.
To provide suggestive evidence of a causal channel, we check that newspapers report abortion
Circuit decisions using original data collection of articles from newspapers in the cities of the
Circuit Court headquarters. Next, we present evidence that information on court decisions can affect
attitudes. We randomly assign newspaper summaries of pro- or anti-abortion decisions to data-entry
workers in a transcription task. When exposed to pro-abortion decisions, workers backlash. Their
attitudes become more anti-abortion, especially on discretionary abortions, consistent with the
population analysis.
Our paper makes three main contributions. First, we present a stylized model for thermostatic
patterns. Second, we present causal evidence exploiting the random assignment of policymakers.
Third, use a data entry experiment of newsreports to support the information channel. Our results
are reasonably robust to perturbations of the empirical specification. Our results are also related
to studies of the effects of laws on custom (Aldashev et al. 2012). The remainder of the paper is
organized as follows. Details on abortion policies in the U.S. are in Appendix A. Section 2 presents
our model. Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4, we detail the empirical strategy. Section 5
presents the impacts of judge identity on abortion rulings. Section 6 estimates the effects of abortion
precedents. Section 7 examines newspaper reports. Section 8 describes the data entry experiment.
Section 9 concludes.
2 Model
2.1 AssumptionsWe model the effects of law on attitudes. We assume two periods, where the
agent undertakes actions at time t = 0 that affects the likelihood of an abortion at t = 1. We
assume having an abortion is the outcome the agent would like to avoid.8 We normalize the utility
8This is suggested by survey evidence. Chen and Schonger (2016) reports on surveys of prospective parents on whether
they would choose to abort a fetus with Down Syndrome. The key result is that as the likelihood of Down Syndrome
increased the more likely the parents would choose to abort. This result is consistent with agents having perception
motives where they derive negative utility from saying that they would abort a fetus with Down Syndrome.
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of having an abortion as negative, denoted by −ua < 0, and 0 otherwise.9 We also assume that once
the agent has had an abortion, there will be no subsequent changes to the utility from additional
abortions. This captures a lexicographic utility function.10 The only behavioral response of interest
is by those agents who have not previously had abortions.
The probability that the agent will have an abortion depends on two factors: the outside
(exogenous) factor q, and the internal (endogenous) factor p. q captures both societal attitudes
towards abortion and laws regulating access to abortion.11 The higher the q, the greater likelihood
of abortion. The internal factor p is the set of actions the agent takes at date t = 0 to not have an
abortion at t = 1. These actions can include backlash in attitudes or campaign donations. These
actions come at a cost c(p) ≥ 0, which are convex: c′ > 0, c′′ > 0. Also, c(0) = 0. We assume no
strategic play and information is symmetric, so that agent’s actions will be truthful representation of
their beliefs. Therefore, we may generalize and call these actions as “negative perceptions” towards
abortion. The greater is an agent’s backlash (intensity of negative attitude, further funding of pro-life
causes or politicians), the lower likelihood of having an abortion.
2.2 Static OptimizationThe overall probability of abortion is P (q−p). For an interior solution,
it must be that P ′ > 0. We also assume P ′′ > 0.12 Normalizing the discount factor between periods
to 1, the net utility of the maximizing agent will be given by:
max
p
{(P (q − p)) (−ua)− c(p)}.
We can normalize the costs c(p) by ua, and with slight change of notation, rewrite the new
costs again as c(p). Thus, the net utility of the agent will be:
9The setup can also be generalized to heterogenous agents, and the intuition will continue to hold. With heterogeneous
agents the utility of abortion will be distributed over a support, and some may even obtain positive utility from
abortion. But in the representative agent framework, it is safe to assume that the average of the distribution - the
mean utility of abortion, is negative.
10An intuition for lexicographic utility is to consider acts that are deontological or duty-based (Chen and Schonger
2016). Another intuition comes from the following thought experiment. Suppose an individual (who believes in 1
god) is asked whether s/he believe in 2 gods, and then asked, how much would they have to be paid to say that
they believe in 2 gods, 3 gods, and so on. It is plausible that individuals have a lexicographic cost of deviating from
saying what they actually believe, such that they report the identical price for each request.
11It also captures the costs of not having abortion, such as child-bearing costs.
12This will be the case if the overall probability distribution follows an S-shaped curve, and the equilibrium level is
on the left part of the distribution. This is a realistic assumption, as the probability of abortion, i.e. the share of
abortions in a representative agent framework, is rather small.
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max
p
{−P (q − p)− c(p)}.
If the agent has not yet had an abortion, the optimization will have the solution:
P ′(q − p) = c′(p).
Or,
p = q − P ′−1(c′(p)).
If the agent has already had an abortion, the positive costs for any p > 0 ensure that their
equilibrium level will be p∗ = 0. There is no point to backlash as it makes no difference to their
utility.
2.3 DynamicsTo look at the dynamics of laws and norms, we assume that the share of abortions
in the society is at a steady-state equilibrium.13 More specifically, denote by s0 the share of the
population at time t = 0 who have not had abortion in the past; 1− s0 have had.
From the former group, the share s = P (q − p) will have an abortion at t = 1. Moreover,
assume share α of new people enter the population, by becoming of child-bearing age. Also, share
β of the population exit, e.g., through death. Note that none in the α share of the population have
had abortion in the past, and some of β share may have had abortion in the past.
At period t = 1 the share of the population with no prior abortion will then be: s0(1−s)(1−
β) + α. The steady-state obtains when s0 satisfies:
s0(1− s)(1− β) + α = s0,
13This is a standard assumption in models in macroeconomics and natural sciences.
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This yields the equilibrium share of the population in the society with no abortion as:
s0 =
α
s+ β − sβ
.
Note, that this is also steady-state equilibrium; if the initial value of s0 is above (below) the
equilibrium value, then over time the values will decrease (increase) to the steady state level. Also,
the equilibrium satisfies 0 ≤ s0 ≤ 1 for a range of values for s, α, and β. For instance, if α = β,
then




This corresponds to the case where the mass of the populations is constant (there’s no net
growth) of, say, 1, and s0 is the fraction of the population with no abortion.
To look at the equilibrium effects of abortion decisions, suppose a pro-choice decision is
issued, which increases q. From the Implicit Function Theorem, we have:











P ′′(q − p∗)
P ′′(q − p∗) + c′′(p∗)
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Thus, a pro-choice decision at time t = 0 leads to higher p - heightened negative perceptions
against abortion. This is the initial backlash effect in the society; the overall level of the negative
perceptions in society will equal s0p.
2.4 Long-Term Effects: Persistent Backlash or Subsequent AcceptanceTo look at the
long-term effects of a pro-choice decision, at time t = 1 both p∗ and s0 will change. Recall that the




s∗ + β − s∗β
=
αp∗
P (q − p∗) + β − P (q − p∗)β
.
To understand the level of negative perceptions at t = 1 when there is a pro-choice decision
at t = 0, observe that q increases both the numerator and the denominator of s0p∗. The overall
effect depends on the relative increase of p∗ in the numerator compared to the increase of P (q− p∗)
in the denominator.
If a large increase in p∗ offsets the increase in the probability of abortions, then the long-term
equilibrium will also yield backlash. If backlash is relatively costless, then any change in law can be
internalized, which renders persistent backlash - in the model, the increase in the numerator is larger
than the increase in the denominator. Otherwise, at t = 1, the overall effect of a pro-choice decision
reduces negative attitudes towards abortion.14 With costly backlash, the pro-choice decision has a
sizable impact on the number of abortions. Then, the overall ratio in the previous equation will
decrease. It is intuitive to think of laws that may initially be unpopular, to become accepted by
changing the behavior of the population.
14To understand the intuition further, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, there is q̂, and p̂ ∈ [p, p∗], such that
P (q − p∗)− P (q − p) = P ′(q̂ − p̂)∆(q − p).
Also, since P ′(q − p∗) = c′(p∗), and P ′(q − p) = c′(p), by continuity, there is q̃, and p̃ ∈ [p, p∗], such that




s∗ + β − s∗β
=
αp∗
P (q − p∗) + β − P (q − p∗)β
=
αp∗
c′(p̃)∆(q − p)(1− β) + β
.
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2.5 DiscussionThe model has the prediction that a “big bang” approach to legal change yields
substantial backlash, which can persist, whereas gradual legal change shifts preferences in the direc-
tion the law intends.15 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has commented that in terms of the potential to
shift societal norms, certain Supreme Court rulings may have been litigated “too soon”, a comment
formalized in our model of backlash and legitimization.
3 Data
3.1 Legal DataWe collect four legal datasets. Our first two datasets comprise the universe of
Circuit and District rulings on abortion cases. Sunstein et al. (2006) and Kastellec (2013) collected
data from 1971 to mid-200416 a total of 145 rulings. The authors coded each as either “pro-choice,”
favoring abortion rights and stronger protections from anti-abortion protest methods, or “pro-life.”
We follow their method to collect all District Court cases. The cases largely consist of challenges to
state statutes, local ordinances, or other government policies regulating abortion access. Examples
include parental notification or consent requirements for minors seeking abortions,17 prohibitions
on state funding for abortions,18 and “partial-birth” abortion bans.19 A small portion of the cases
represents challenges to restrictions on anti-abortion protesting.20
We also collected data from the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOC) and PACER
filings on District Court cases to merge judge identities.21 This administrative data facilitates ad-
ditional randomization checks. Our data on judge biographical characteristics come from several
sources: the Appeals Court Attribute Data, the District Court Attribute Data,22 the Federal Judi-
cial Center, and our own data collection. All together we have information on judge’s geographic
history, education, occupational history, governmental positions, military service, religion, race,
15To see this formally, observe that the increase in the numerator is flexible since p∗ = q − P ′−1(c′(p)), but the
increase in the denominator is limited because (1− β)P < 1.
16They collected using a Lexis search for “core-terms (abortion) and date aft 1960 and constitutional” and “abortion
and constitution!” between January 1, 1971 and June 30, 2004.
17See, e.g., Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of Akron, 651 F.2d 1198 (6th Cir., 1981); Manning
v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254 (4th Cir., 1997); Planned Parenthood Of Northern New England v. Heed, 390 F.3d 53 (1st
Cir., 2004).
18See, e.g., D R v. Mitchell, 645 F.2d 852 (10th Cir., 1981); State of New York v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2nd Cir.,
1989)
19See, e.g., Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir., 1999); Rhode Island Medical Society v. Whitehouse, 239
F.3d 104 (1st Cir., 2001).
20See, e.g., Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir., 1995); U.S. v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253 (3rd Cir., 2000).
21Sixteen years of Public Access to Court Electronic Records are available on open source sites for 33 Districts. We
used PACER data to obtain judge identities that are missing in the AOC data.
22http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/attributes.html
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gender, and political affiliations. Raw data on religion come from Goldman (1999).23 Judges whose
religions remained missing or unknown were coded as having no publicly known religious affiliation.
We filled in missing data by searching transcripts of Congressional confirmation hearings and other
official or news publications on Lexis.
3.2 Outcomes DataWe are interested in four key outcomes to measure the impact of abortion
rulings. For impacts on media, we collated mentions of Courts of Appeals decisions in articles from
the major newspaper for the city in which each Circuit Court resides. These are: The Boston Globe,
New York Times, Philadelphia Inquirer, Richmond Times Dispatch, Times-Picayune, Cincinnati
Post, Chicago Tribune, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, San Francisco Chronicle, Denver Post, Atlanta
Journal and Constitution, and The Washington Post. We collected data from 1979 to 2010 from
NewsBank.24
To study the impacts on laws and regulations, a commonly-used database on state laws
provides an index on abortion restrictions. This index includes, for example, mandatory delay, ban
on using Medicaid to fund abortion, and requiring parental notification (Blank et al. 1996).25 Sub-
indicators for specific laws are coded as the share of the year in which the law is binding. The overall
index is the average of sub-indicators.
We also collate charitable donations for abortion causes from the Database on Ideology,
Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) (Bonica 2013). This data comes from the Federal Election
Commission and state reporting agencies that require disclosure of donors’ addresses, names, and
employers. It contains over 100 million contributions made by individuals and organizations to local,
state, and federal elections spanning a period from 1979-2012. We identify charitable contributions
made to pro-choice and pro-life tax exempt organizations and political candidates. We identify 113
pro-choice and 307 pro-life donation recipients. Examples of pro-choice recipients in the data include
the National Abortion Rights Action League, Planned Parenthood, and political candidates William
23Additional religion data are available at http://courseweb.stthomas.edu/gcsisk/religion.study.data/cover.htm.
Missing data are collected by our own news searches following their method of searching for wedding announcements
or funerals.
24We used the search term: “abortion in All Text and Circuit or Circuit in All Text and judgment or "court ruling"
in All Text not "Supreme Court" in All Text not state near10 Circuit in All Text”.
25For example, a number of states have used state funds to pay for Medicaid abortions for low-income women since
the passage of the Hyde Amendment prohibited Federal funding. Other examples include parental consent or
notification laws for teenagers seeking abortions.
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Weld and Barbara Boxer. Examples of pro-life recipients include National Right to Life, the Susan
B. Anthony List, and political candidates Paul Ryan and Rick Santorum.
We observe a total of 3.5 million records of individual charitable donations to abortion-
related recipients. 13% of the records were of contributions to pro-choice recipients, with a mean of
$644 donated; 87% were of contributions to pro-life recipients, with a mean of $272. Over 20,000
cities appear with at least one abortion-related contribution during the time period. We aggregate
the individual donations at the city level. Results are similar if aggregated to the state level.
Finally, we use the General Social Survey (GSS) with U.S. State identifiers. The GSS is an
annual individual-level survey from 1973 to 1994 (except for 1979, 1981, and 1992), and biannually
after 1994. For each year, the GSS randomly selects a cross-sectional sample of 1,500 - 3,000 residents
who are at least 18 years old. The GSS asks a variety of abortion attitude questions. These questions
are on the legality of abortions in different circumstances. We aggregate responses into an index,
where higher values correspond to reduced support for abortion. We construct demographic controls
like age, gender, educational attainment, and race. As standard in the literature, we also use survey
weights provided by GSS in our regressions.
To preview our data, we find the average Circuit experienced 0.36 abortion decisions in a
year. Among the Circuit-years with any abortion decisions, 55% of the panel decisions were pro-
choice. Figure 1 shows the yearly frequency of pro-abortion and anti-abortion decisions nationwide.
Appendix A provides additional summary statistics on attitudes over time.
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1971 1981 1991 2001
Year
Number of Pro−Choice Abortion Decisions
Number of Pro−Life Abortion Decisions
Appelate Abortion Decisions, 1971−2004
4 Specification
We use regressions of the form:
(1) Yict = β0 + β1Lawct + β21[Mct > 0] + β3Cc + β4Tt + β5Xict + β6Wct + εict
where β1 captures the effect of pro-abortion vs. anti-abortion precedent, β1 + β2 captures the effect
of pro-abortion precedent vs. no precedent, and β2 captures the effect of anti-abortion precedent
vs. no precedent. Yict is an outcome (index of state abortion regulations, charitable donations, or
abortion preferences) for individual, city, or state i in Circuit c and year t. Lawct is the share of
pro-abortion precedents (but typically it is 0 or 1, a single verdict). We extend our specification to
include the presence of a decision, 1 [Mct−n > 0], where M is the number of cases (typically 0 or
1), Xict individual characteristics (such as age and gender), and Wct characteristics of the pool of
judges available to be assigned. Due to random assignment being at the Circuit-year level, clustering
standard errors yields roughly identical results whether clustering at the Circuit or the Circuit-year
14
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level.26
We present randomization checks in Appendix B. Our 2SLS can be described more formally
as follows. We seek an instrumental variable for Lawct using judges’ biographical characteristics. Let




∗ 1 [Mct−n > 0], i.e., defined to be 0 when 1 [Mct−n > 0] = 0. Then: E[(pct −E(pct))εict] =
Pr[Mct > 0]E[(pct − E(pct))εict|Mct > 0] + Pr[Mct = 0]E[(pct − E(pct))εict|Mct = 0] = 0. Next,
E[(pct−E(pct))εict] = E(pctεict)−E[E(pct)εict] = E(pctεict)−E(pct)E(εict) = E[pctεict]. Our moment
condition for causal inference is: E[Nct
Mct
εict|E(NctMct ), 1 [Mct > 0]] = 0. We use party, race, and religion
for our basic 2SLS (labeled “Naive”). We also use LASSO to select instruments (Belloni et al. 2012).27
All 2SLS estimates use the limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator because of
its better small sample properties. We also present a LIML estimate using all the instruments and
a visualization of different 2SLS estimates from the judicial characteristics that are among the top
50 in instrument strength.
It is also worth noting that if we restrict to Circuit-years with 1[Mct > 0] = 1, we only
estimate β1. If we follow an intuitive approach of averaging of pro-abortion (+1) and anti-abortion
(−1) in constructing Lawct, we likewise restrict β2 = 0. If we follow the specification described
earlier, we distinguish pro-abortion vs. anti-abortion vs. a benchmark of no precedent.
5 The Effect of Judge Identity on Court Outcomes
Table I shows that judges’ politics, race, and religion predict abortion decisions. To express
succinctly, switching from an all-Republican to all-Democrat panel increases the likelihood of a
pro-abortion precedent by 29% and switching from an all-minority to all-white panel increases
26Barrios et al. (2012) show that random assignment of treatment addresses serial and spatial correlation across
treatment units, since “if the covariate of interest is randomly assigned at the cluster level, only accounting for
non-zero covariances at the cluster level, and ignoring correlations between clusters, leads to valid standard errors
and confidence intervals.” We check results using randomization inference that assigns the legal variation to another
Circuit and the robustness of our results to using wild bootstrap. The coefficients on the leads serve as an omnibus
falsification check for spurious significance.
27We analyze characteristics including party affiliation, race, gender, religion, holding a BA degree from an institution
within the state, and ABA ratings—the Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary of the American Bar Asso-
ciation publishes evaluations of nominees to the lower federal courts and judges perceived as high quality may be
less likely to be influenced by their biographical characteristics. We include interactions of all mentioned variables.
The characteristics are defined as dummies. Some characteristics, like Black and non-White (which includes include
Hispanics and Asians), are included as separate dummies.
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the likelihood of an pro-abortion precedent by 51% (Column 4).28 Two of the LASSO-selected
characteristics are Democrat and secular, but LASSO also picks minority Republican judges and
black judges with a bachelor’s degree from within the state.29 These judges tend to vote against
abortion.30 Were we to use the predicted estimate from the first stage (akin to judge leniency) instead
of biographical characteristics, we greatly strengthen the F-statistic. Weighting the regressions using
the geometric mean of decisions in a Circuit-year also greatly strengthens the instrument.
Table II shows these judicial patterns are also found in the population. The variable “in-
state” (whether the respondent lives in the same state where s/he grew up) is the closest proxy for
an in-state BA degree in the GSS. The collection of Naive and LASSO-selected instruments predict
abortion support.
An unusual feature of U.S. federal appellate courts is that, technically, cases should only
appear in the appellate courts if they present new legal issues that require interpretation of the law.
Cases with identical fact patterns should not be appealed. Therefore, we can present another check
of our identification strategy: We should not expect the assignment of judges in a previous year to
predict the decisions in a subsequent year. This is reported in Appendix B.
Previous research has found that district judge demographic characteristics are correlated
with reversal rates in the Courts of Appeals (Haire, Songer, and Lindquist 2003; Sen 2015; Barondes
2010; Steinbuch 2009). Expected reversal rates could encourage litigants to pursue an appeal. To









, where Kcdt denotes the number of cases
filed in District court d within Circuit c at time t (J goes from 5 to 13 depending on the District).
Lcdt denotes the number of judges with a particular characteristic assigned to cases. District Courts
are discussed further in Appendix C. We find that District Court cases assigned judges with prior
congressional counsel experience are approximately 33% more likely to be appealed. Cases assigned
judges born in the 1920s and with other federal experience are 7% more likely to be appealed. One
reason for certain judges to be appealed more often may be that their decisions may be perceived
28Bivariate correlations are omitted due to space constraints.
29The instruments chosen by LASSO do not vary much with the inclusion or exclusion of controls. The instruments
chosen by LASSO differ for the state law outcomes since the GSS is population representative while the state law
dataset will weight sparsely populated regions more. However, the demographic characteristics selected by LASSO
are still intuitive: Evangelical Republicans, Black Catholics, and Minority Catholics.
30The difference in the judge-level sample size between Columns 1 and 5 (326 vs 325) is due to the lack of data for
one judge on whether the BA degree is from within the state.
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TABLE II
Relationship between Abortion Attitudes and Demographic Characteristics in GSS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)







Repub. X Non-white 0.0899∗∗
(0.0171)
Repub. X In-state 0.0886∗
(0.0286)
Observations 32982 32982 32982 32982 887 32982
The dependent variable is an index of abortion attitudes - created as an average of answers to questions
about the legality of abortions in different circumstances. Larger values of the index correspond to greater
support for making abortion illegal. The biographical characteristics correspond to instruments used in
the main model. Variable “in-state” is the best proxy for in-state BA degree found in the GSS – whether
the respondent lives in the same state where s/he grew up. All models include Circuit and year fixed
effects. Standard errors are clustered on Circuit-year level. + significant at 10%, * significant at 5%, **
significant at 1%.
as more political and easier to be reversed. We examine estimates of the effects of Circuit rulings
with and without using this District court instrument.
18
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TABLE III
First Stage: Judicial Biographical Characteristics in District Cases and the Presence of an
Appeal in Circuit Courts
(1) (2)
Prior Congressional Counsel 0.380∗∗ 0.335∗∗
(0.0832) (0.0972)
Democrat X High ABA Score -0.0231 -0.0218
(0.0232) (0.0251)
Republican X Age<40 When Appointed 0.00676 -0.0120
(0.101) (0.0963)






Analysis level GSS GSS
First stage regressions at the GSS level - the presence of a Circuit case in a given Circuit-year regressed
on the share of District cases with a particular judge biographical characteristic. We control for Circuit
and year fixed effects and expected proportion of District cases with the analyzed judge characteristics.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the
Circuit-year level. + Significant at 10%; * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%.
6 Estimating the Impact of Abortion Precedents
6.1 State Abortion Regulations In baseline estimates, within two years after an anti-abortion
decision, states are roughly 20% more likely to restrict abortion through regulations requiring
mandatory delay, banning the use of Medicaid payments to fund abortion, and requiring parental
notification. Figure 2 displays the results.31 The effect appears as a level effect rather than a growth
effect. Effects are observed immediately and become statistically significant by the second year and
remain statistically significant thereafter.
To interpret the coefficient size, roughly one pro-abortion precedent reduces the chance
of having the state abortion regulation by 18 percentage points in all states and for all three
regulations. The magnitude of the effects indicate that the response is not “mechanical” in the
sense that if the state’s law is being litigated and it is rejected, we should expect that state under
litigation to terminate the law. Instead we observe that all the states in the Circuit are following
31All β1 coefficients come from a single-lag model in which the contemporaneous outcome variable (state law index)
is regressed on the law variable and presence of a case. Lower values mean fewer restrictions to abortion access.
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the pro-abortion precedent.32
Figure 2.— Pro-Abortion Precedent Impact on State Laws Restricting Abortion
Lower values of the state law index indicate fewer restrictions on abortions. All coefficients come from
single-lag model in which contemporaneous outcome variable (state law index) was regressed on the law
variable and presence of a case. Counterfactual is anti-abortion precedent. Instruments are Democrat,
Secular, and Non-white judge characteristics. 95% confidence intervals are presented as dashed lines.
It is worth noting that an extensive empirical literature has examined the impact of state
abortion regulations on reproductive behavior (Levine et al. 1999; Klick and Stratmann 2003), child
and adult outcomes (Gruber et al. 1999; Ananat et al. 2009), and crime (Donohue and Levitt 2001).
In particular, liberalized access to abortion allowed large numbers of women to delay marriage
and motherhood (Myers 2017). Our results contribute to a large political economy literature that
argues that court rulings have no effect (Rosenberg 1993). The LIML estimates in Table IV appear
strongest for parental notification.
We check if our results are due to the a handful of panel compositions of cases. We estimate
2SLS for each judicial composition that comprise the top fifty in statistical significance for the
first stage instruments. These estimates are visualized in Figure 3. We see the impact on parental
notification laws is most salient in the lower right panel.33
32Assuming that all the Circuit cases involve litigation over laws recorded in Blank et al. (1996) would mean that
the effects are roughly twice the impact of the mechanical effect.
33Similar checks are displayed for other results in Appendix E.
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TABLE IV









OLS -0.0749** 0.000599 -0.0729** 0.00344 -0.0422 0.205 -0.110** 0.00675
Naive -0.241** 0.00409 -0.201* 0.0215 -0.286** 0.00541 -0.236 0.124
LIML -0.119** 0.0000269 -0.0849** 0.00405 -0.0956+ 0.0782 -0.174** 0.0000681
LASSO -0.218** 0.00868 -0.407** 0.00464 -0.122 0.261 -0.125 0.208
N 1224 1224 1224 1224
State laws index is the average of indicators for: mandatory delay required, ban on using Medicaid to fund
abortion, and parental notification required. Main independent variable is pro-abortion precedent in the
Circuit-year. Counterfactual is anti-abortion precedent. Law variable is instrumented in rows 2-4 with
judicial characteristics, i.e. share of judges with given characteristic on abortion panels. Regressions
control for Circuit and year fixed effects. We also control for probabilities of being assigned a judge with
these characteristics. Naive instruments are Democrat, Secular, and Non-white judicial characteristics.
LASSO instruments are the following judicial characteristics: Republican X Evangelical; Catholic X Black;
Catholic X Non-white. P-values are based on standard errors clustered by Circuit-year. + Significant at
10%; * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%.
Figure 3.— Alternative Impacts of Pro-Abortion Precedent on State Laws Five Years Later
The yellow lines indicate the Naive 2SLS and the blue lines indicate the LIML estimates (which uses all
the biographical characteristics). The shaded gray area is the LIML confidence interval. The red dots
indicate alternative estimates using other biographical characteristics whose first stage F-statistics in
Circuit-year level regressions yield the top 50 F-statistics controlling for E(pct).21
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Next, we show that pro-abortion and anti-abortion precedents have opposite effects relative
to the baseline of no precedent. In LIML estimates, Table V finds that pro-abortion precedents
reduce the state law index by 0.067 while anti-abortion precedents increase the index by 0.053. This
supports the approach of treating pro- and anti- decisions as +1 and −1 in empirical analyses of
cumulative laws used in Ura (2014) and Hernandez (2014).
TABLE V
Impact of Pro-Abortion vs. No vs. Anti-Abortion Precedent on State Laws Five Years Later
OLS Naive IV LIML LASSO N
State Laws Index 1224
Law (Pro-choice) -0.075** -0.122+ -0.121** -0.137**
P-value 0.001 0.059 0 0
Present 0.031+ 0.247 0.053** 0.104
P-value 0.071 0.457 0.006 0.277
Law + Present -0.044* 0.126 -0.067** -0.033
P-value 0.010 0.709 0 0.762
State laws index is the average of indicators for: mandatory delay required, ban on using Medicaid to fund
abortion, and parental notification required. Main independent variable is pro-abortion precedent in the
Circuit-year. The law variable is instrumented in Columns 2-4 with judicial characteristics. Regressions
control for Circuit and year fixed effects. We also control for probabilities of being assigned a judge with
these characteristics. Naive instruments are Democrat, Secular, and Non-white judicial characteristics.
LASSO instruments are the following judicial characteristics: Republican X Evangelical; Catholic X Black;
Catholic X Non-white. Presence of an appeal is instrumented for with District IVs. LIML uses the entire
available instruments set. P-values are based on standard errors clustered by Circuit-year. + Significant at
10%; * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%.
6.2 Campaign DonationsTurning to campaign donations, Table VI shows the combined effect
of (i) anti-abortion precedents stimulating pro-abortion donations and (ii) pro-abortion precedents
reducing pro-abortion donations (e.g., after a win, donors are satisfied). The dependent variable is
in logs, which means the LIML estimates correspond to roughly 15% shift. The effect appears on
the total amount rather than the number of donors. This would be consistent with court decisions
activating partisans–people who were pro-abortion becoming more so–and the strengthening of
existing attitudes rather than the shift of attitudes among non-donors (Green et al. 2004).
Table VII suggests that anti-abortion precedents appear to fully account for the LIML effect
on pro-abortion donations. The Naive 2SLS estimate suggests that pro-abortion precedents increase
anti-abortion donations. However, in general, the results here and in Table VI suggest that anti-
abortion donations may be more inelastic than pro-abortion donations.34
34Appendix D presents additional results and robustness checks.
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TABLE VI





P-value N Pro-choice P-value N Pro-life P-value
OLS -0.102 0.167 0.0751 0.481 -0.0473 0.113 0.0780 0.842
Naive -0.240** 0.00655 0.144 0.296 0.332 0.766 0.0658 0.940
LIML -0.153* 0.0132 -0.0209 0.796 -0.152 0.510 -0.0774 0.688
LASSO -0.347 0.242 -0.688 0.148 -0.260 0.592 -0.932 0.200
N 26203 48117 596592 596592
Dependent variables are log of total donations to pro-life and pro-choice organizations as well as number
of individuals who donate to these organizations. Main independent variable is pro-abortion precedent in
the Circuit-year. Counterfactual is anti-abortion precedent. The law variable is instrumented in rows 2-4
with judicial characteristics. Regressions control for Circuit and year fixed effects. We also control for
probabilities of being assigned a judge with these characteristics. Naive instruments are Democrat,
Secular, and Non-white judicial characteristics. LASSO instruments are the following judicial
characteristics: Democrat, Secular, Non-white Republican, and Black judge with an in-state BA degree.
LIML uses the entire available instruments set. P-values are based on standard errors clustered by
Circuit-year. + Significant at 10%; * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%.
TABLE VII
Impact of Pro-Abortion vs. No vs. Anti-Abortion Precedent on Abortion-Related Donations
OLS Naive IV LIML LASSO N
Total Amount Pro-choice 26203
Law (Pro-choice) -0.102 -0.235 -0.104 0.029
P-value 0.159 0.105 0.249 0.836
Present 0.098+ 0.027 0.099+ 0.034
P-value 0.060 0.763 0.092 0.751
Law + Present -0.004 -0.208 -0.005 0.063
P-value 0.923 0.106 0.920 0.303
Total Amount Pro-life 48117
Law (Pro-choice) 0.075 0.245+ 0.103 -0.226
P-value 0.367 0.099 0.287 0.586
Present -0.081 -0.083 -0.096 0.076
P-value 0.237 0.515 0.212 0.759
Law + Present -0.006 0.162 0.007 -0.150
P-value 0.936 0.329 0.918 0.435
Dependent variables are log of total donations to pro-life and pro-choice organizations aggregated to the
contributor city level. Main independent variable is pro-abortion precedent in the Circuit-year. The law
variable is instrumented in Columns 2-4 with judicial characteristics. Regressions control for Circuit and
year fixed effects. We also control for probabilities of being assigned a judge with these characteristics.
Naive instruments are Democrat, Secular, and Non-white judicial characteristics. LASSO instruments are
the following judicial characteristics: Democrat, Secular, Non-white Republican, and Black judge with an
in-state BA degree. LIML uses the entire available instruments set. P-values are based on standard errors
clustered by Circuit-year. + Significant at 10%; * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%.
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6.3 Abortion Attitudes In this sub-section we study the impact of abortion rulings on abortion
attitudes. Table VIII shows that Republicans35 strongly increase anti-abortion attitudes in response
to pro-abortion precedents, especially for “Should it be illegal for a woman to obtain abortion for
any reason?” The magnitudes are roughly equivalent to the differential between Republicans and
Democrats. The effects are observed individually for “does not want more children”, “woman is
single”, “family is poor”, “pregnancy is a result of rape”, but not for “high chance of child’s defect”
and “mother’s health is endangered”. This would be consistent with Franklin and Kosaki (1989)’s
finding of backlash over “discretionary” abortions. Democrats are less significantly affected than
Republicans.
Republicans seem to respond to pro-abortion precedent and not to anti-abortion precedent.
Naive IV estimates in Table IX illustrate for “Should it be illegal for a woman to obtain abortion for
any reason?” A pro-abortion precedent makes Republicans more likely to oppose abortion for this
reason by roughly 20% and this is almost entirely due to pro-abortion precedent vs. no precedent.
Naive IV estimates in Table IX illustrate for Democrats. An anti-abortion precedent causes
them to increase pro-abortion attitudes36 by 8.7% relative to the counterfactual of no precedent.
However, for other discretionary reasons, like for any reason and desired fertility, Democrats also
backlash. Appendix E shows the effects are reasonably robust to alternative specifications.
35We label as Republicans the GSS respondents who identify themselves as strong or leaning Republicans (and not
as Independent).
36“Should it be illegal for a woman to obtain abortion because the family is poor?”
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TABLE IX
Impact of Pro-Abortion vs. No vs. Anti-Abortion Precedent on Abortion Attitudes
Republicans Democrats
OLS Naive IV LIML LASSO N OLS Naive IV LIML LASSO N
Z-score index 6317 9092
Law (Pro-choice) 0.049 0.267+ 0.048 0.132+ 0.112** -0.002 0.116* 0.015
P-value 0.317 0.053 0.391 0.067 0.006 0.981 0.011 0.831
Present -0.065+ -0.076 -0.065 -0.051 -0.036 -0.079 -0.038 -0.037
P-value 0.080 0.476 0.101 0.625 0.217 0.294 0.204 0.619
Law + Present -0.016 0.191+ -0.017 0.082 0.076* -0.081 0.077* -0.022
P-value 0.645 0.071 0.655 0.302 0.012 0.311 0.017 0.731
Simple average index 6317 9092
Law (Pro-choice) 0.021 0.124* 0.020 0.064+ 0.049** -0.003 0.052** 0.007
P-value 0.338 0.048 0.419 0.051 0.006 0.943 0.009 0.821
Present -0.026 -0.034 -0.026 -0.025 -0.016 -0.038 -0.017 -0.020
P-value 0.113 0.478 0.140 0.584 0.224 0.256 0.190 0.541
Law + Present -0.005 0.090+ -0.006 0.038 0.034* -0.041 0.035* -0.013
P-value 0.726 0.063 0.727 0.280 0.012 0.250 0.014 0.647
Table notes similar to that of Table VIII.
6.4 Medium-Run ImpactWithin two years, we find persuasive effects of law in Table X. Several
specifications yield consistent evidence of persuasive effects–after pro-abortion precedent, people are
less likely to be anti-abortion two years later. A larger set of sensitivity analyses are presented in
Appendix E.
In separating the effects of pro-abortion and anti-abortion precedents, Table XI and Ap-
pendix E show that pro-abortion decisions cause Republicans to have more pro-abortion attitudes
two years later.
TABLE XI
Impact of Pro-Abortion vs. None vs. Anti-Abortion Precedent on Abortion Attitudes Two Years
Later
Republicans Democrats
OLS Naive IV LIML LASSO N OLS Naive IV LIML LASSO N
Z-score index 6317 9092
Law (Pro-choice) -0.050 -0.426* -0.038 -0.244** 0.017 -0.058 0.022 -0.010
P-value 0.336 0.012 0.583 0.001 0.654 0.653 0.634 0.878
Present 0.073+ -0.034 0.066 -0.117 -0.019 -0.088 -0.021 -0.097
P-value 0.099 0.730 0.222 0.167 0.508 0.157 0.502 0.114
Law + Present 0.023 -0.459** 0.028 -0.360** -0.002 -0.146 0 -0.108
P-value 0.492 0.001 0.429 0 0.955 0.189 0.997 0.114
Simple average index 6317 9092
Law (Pro-choice) -0.023 -0.188* -0.017 -0.103** 0.009 -0.030 0.011 -0.012
P-value 0.329 0.012 0.578 0.001 0.592 0.600 0.597 0.682
Present 0.031 -0.020 0.028 -0.059 -0.010 -0.042 -0.011 -0.045+
P-value 0.115 0.637 0.244 0.106 0.450 0.124 0.458 0.082
Law + Present 0.008 -0.208** 0.011 -0.162** -0.001 -0.071 0 -0.057+
P-value 0.562 0.001 0.491 0 0.966 0.136 0.996 0.055
Table notes similar to that of Table X.
26

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2928175
7 Newsreports
To support the causal channel from court rulings to preferences, previous studies have linked
Supreme Court precedents with subsequent changes in public opinions about abortion (Franklin
and Kosaki 1989). Hoekstra (2000) suggests that local media are more likely to report on cases in
their community and that local residents are more likely to be aware of those cases than cases in
other jurisdictions.
This section reports an analysis for abortion decisions using the simple search detailed previ-
ously. We show a plot that correlates the number of abortion rulings and the number of newsreports
about abortion rulings from 1979 to 2004. Controlling for Circuit and year fixed effects, we find
a positive relationship between the number of abortion decisions and the number of newspaper
mentions. The relationship is statistically significant (p < 0.05) for abortion precedents that ruled
against abortion. Our liberal-leaning newspaper sample may mobilize readers by reporting on anti-
abortion precedents.
28
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Figure 4.— Newspaper Reports on Abortion Decisions
Not every newspaper is available for every year, so we divide the number of newspaper articles by the
proportion of newspapers available (e.g., if only half of the typical newspaper coverage is available because
of data limitations, we multiply by a factor of two to make a consistent series in the figure). This allows us
to compare graphically the number of Circuit decisions and newspaper articles about abortion precedents
over time.
8 Data Entry Experiment
Our final step in the causal chain checks if newsreports activate people to shift stated pref-
erences. We conduct an online experiment. We recruit workers through Amazon Mechanical Turk
to transcribe text. The transcription is randomized to be a pro-abortion court decision, an anti-
abortion court decision, or a placebo about jazz music. All workers see identical instructions. Details
are in Appendix F. We recruited 345 data entry workers.
We define treatment as 1, 0,−1 when they face Pro-Abortion Decision, Control Group, and
Anti-Abortion Decision, respectively. The empirical specification is:
Outcomeit = α + β1Treatmentt + β2Xit + εit(1)
Workers exposed to Pro-Abortion Decisions become anti-abortion on two dimensions of abor-
29
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TABLE XII
The Experimental Effect of Exposure to Pro-Abortion Decisions on Abortion Attitudes
Full sample Males only Females only
Abortion Summary Index 0.0262 (0.0203) 0.0137 (0.0251) 0.0419 (0.0341)
It should NOT be possible not obtain legal abortion if:
There is strong chance of serious defect in the baby -0.00464 (0.0252) -0.0181 (0.0321) 0.0104 (0.0410)
She is married and she does not want any more children 0.0304 (0.0324) -0.00576 (0.0423) 0.0868+ (0.0509)
The woman’s health is seriously endangered by the pregnancy -0.0135 (0.0174) -0.0110 (0.0238) -0.0148 (0.0254)
The family has low income and cannot afford any more children 0.0576+ (0.0327) 0.0427 (0.0427) 0.0727 (0.0515)
She became pregnant as a result of rape 0.0129 (0.0220) 0.0219 (0.0290) -0.00604 (0.0339)
She is not married and does not want to marry the man 0.0323 (0.0329) 0.00751 (0.0431) 0.0606 (0.0514)
The woman wants the abortion for any reason 0.0686* (0.0326) 0.0586 (0.0424) 0.0836 (0.0519)
N 345 150 150
tion attitudes: whether it should NOT be possible to have a legal abortion if the family has very
low income (pro-abortion decisions increase this percentage by 6% points) and cannot afford any
more children, and whether the woman wants abortion for any reason (pro-abortion decisions in-
crease this percentage by 7% points). These effects are statistically significant at the 10% and 5%
level, respectively, and are similar in magnitude to the estimates in the population sample. The
backlash also occurs especially for discretionary abortions. Table XII displays the effects controlling
for gender, age, and log error rates. The effects are robust to the exclusion of these controls or the
inclusion of additional controls, such as dummy indicators for region of origin.
9 Conclusion
Whether laws shape values, and in which direction, is important for at least two reasons.
Empirical results can arbitrate between competing theories about the effects of laws. Empirical
results can inform judges who want to conduct cost-benefit analyses of judicial decisions (Posner
1998) or know whether their decisions accord with the democratic will of the people (Breyer 2006).
The latter effect often motivates arguments for or against policies.
We present a formal model with backlash and persuasive effects suggested by previous em-
pirical studies (Ura 2014; Brickman and Peterson 2006; Franklin and Kosaki 1989; Hanley et al.
2012). Backlash in attitudes or in campaign donations can counteract laws that affect abortion
access. In the long-run, laws can have persuasive effects if the population share of behavior changes.
The model formalizes a comment by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg about legal changes that are
too big. A “big bang” approach yields substantial backlash that can persist, whereas gradual legal
change yields persuasive effects in our model.
We then present causal evidence exploiting the random assignment of U.S. federal judges who
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create geographically local precedent and the fact that judges’ background characteristics predict
abortion precedents. We show that abortion precedents affect states abortion regulations that are
associated with subsequent fertility, reproductive choices, child outcomes, adult outcomes, and crime
(Levine et al. 1999; Klick and Stratmann 2003; Gruber et al. 1999; Ananat et al. 2009; Donohue
and Levitt 2001).
Turning to preferences, we observe a backlash in charitable donations to abortion causes and
polarization of abortion attitudes. The impact of an abortion precedent is equivalent to doubling the
average difference between Republicans and Democrats. However, within two years, the precedents
have persuasive effects. We verify the causal channel with newsreports of abortion rulings and a data
entry experiment of newsreports that match the qualitative patterns from the population analysis.
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A Background
A.1 Abortion policyAbortion policy in the United States is represented at several levels. In the seminal 1973 Roe
v. Wade decision, the U.S. Supreme Court found that constitutional due process rights extend to individual abortions,
but any abortion regulation must be balanced with state interests. In the controversial aftermath, states may not
completely prohibit abortion but have discretion to regulate it, subject to review by the courts. This discretion has
led to much variation in abortion policy across states and localities. Laws on whether a woman can get an abortion
can be codified in state statutes and local ordinances, as well as in regulations by government agencies. While there
is no single comprehensive Federal statute on abortion, a handful of Federal laws target specific components of access
to abortions.37 At the state level, statutory provisions can impose various criteria on women seeking abortions as
well as on abortion providers.38 Other state laws address the public funding of abortions; for example, a majority
of states disallow the use of state funds for abortions except when the woman’s life is in danger or if the pregnancy
was the result of incest or rape.39 At the local level, cities can impose additional ordinances on abortion access and
provision. While governments have discretion in enacting their own abortion laws, they must not conflict with laws of
a higher level (e.g., Federal statutes) and they must meet constitutional requirements, which are determined by the
courts. Therefore, the Federal Circuit Courts play a prominent role in determining abortion policy by adjudicating
legal challenges against government statutes and deciding whether they are unenforceable. A sample of some statutes
and subsequent litigation in the courts is provided in Appendix Table A.1.
37Among these are Title X, enacted in 1970, which allocates Federal funding to family planning services for low
income persons but does not directly fund abortions; the Hyde Amendment, enacted in 1976, which bars Medicaid
for funding abortions; the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, which made it a Federal crime to
block individuals’ access to clinics; and the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which bans late-term abortions.
38Examples include requiring parental consent or notification for minors (36 states), gestational limits that forbid
abortions after a specified period into a pregnancy (38 states), and imposing specific licensing requirements on
clinics and physicians.
39An overview of state-level abortion laws is available at:
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_OAL.pdf.
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APPENDIX TABLE A.1
Federal Statutes and Doctrinal Developments in Abortion Rights LawAppendix Table A. F deral Statutes and Doctrinal Developments in Abo ion Rights Law
Statute or Legal 
Decision
Year Statutory Provision or Doctrinal holding Regulation 
challenged
Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113
1973 The Court recognized the right to choose to have an 
abortion as part of a broader constitutional right of 
privacy. States may proscribe abortion only in the third 
trimester, with an exception for the mother’s health.
Texas statute
Doe v. Bolton, 410 
U.S. 179 
1973 The Court overturned provisions requiring that abortion be 
performed in an accredited hospital, approved by a 
hospital committee, and that three physicians confirm that 
an abortion should be performed.
Georgia 
statute
Hyde Amendment 1976 Federal provision (amendment to Title XIX of the Social 
Security Act) prohibited states from receiving federal 
Medicaid funding for abortions, except when the 
pregnancy jeopardized the mother’s life or the pregnancy 
was the result of rape or incest.
Federal 
statute
Maher v. Roe, 432 
U.S. 464
1977 The Court upheld a state policy that refused to provide 
Medicaid funding for non-therapeutic abortions, allowing 




Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 
438
1977 The Court held that Title XIX of the Social Security Act 
does not require states to fund elective or non-therapeutic 
first trimester abortions to receive Medicaid funding.
Federal 
statute
Harris v. McRae, 448 
U.S. 297





Casey, 505 U.S. 833
1992 The Court upheld statutory provision requiring parental 
notification for minors seeking an abortion, certain 
reporting requirements for abortion provider, and an 
“informed consent” provision requiring abortion providers 
to inform women of the age of the fetus and health risks of 
abortion and childbirth 24 hours before the procedure.  
The Court overturned the provision requiring husband 
notification for married women seeking an abortion and 
rejected the trimester framework of Roe in favor of a 
viability inquiry more in line with medical advances.
Pennsylvania 
statute
Freedom of Access to 
Clinic Entrances Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 248
1994 Federal statute made it a crime to injure, intimidate, or 
interfere with persons seeking to obtain or provide 
reproductive health services or to intentionally damage or 




Choice Network of 
Western New York, 
519 U.S. 357
1997 The Court upheld “fixed buffer zones” around abortion 
clinics that prohibit protestors from demonstrating while 
invalidating “floating buffer zones” around moving 
persons and cars.
Injunction
Stenberg v. Carhart, 
530 U.S. 914
2000 The Court overturned a ban on the “partial-birth” abortion, 
a specific and unusual method of second-trimester 
abortion. Because the statute’s language broadly 
encompassed the standard second-trimester abortion 
procedure as well as this variant, the statute imposed an 
undue burden on a woman’s right to choose.  The statute 
also lacked an exception for the mother’s health.
Nebraska 
statute
Partial Birth Abortion 
Ban Act
2003 This statute prohibited the “partial birth” abortion. Federal 
statute
Gonzales v. Carhart, 
550 U.S. 124
2007 The Court upheld the federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban 
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State regulations have been documented to affect reproductive behavior and socioeconomic outcomes. Dono-
hue and Levitt (2001) suggest that abortion legalization prevented the births of “unwanted” children who would
have been more prone to be involved in crime. Gruber et al. (1999) found that children born post-legalization were
significantly less likely to live in a single-parent family, to live in poverty, to receive welfare, and to die as an infant.
By the time this birth cohort reached their 30s, they are more likely to graduate from college, and less likely to either
use welfare as an adult or be a single-parent (Ananat et al. 2009). This positive selection is widely attributed to
two related factors: cohort selection and size. Women may use abortion to avoid bearing children in adverse circum-
stances, raising the living standards of the children who are born (Levine et al. 1999; Donohue and Levitt 2001). At
the same time, the legalization of abortion has been shown to reduce birthrates by approximately 6% in the seven
years following Roe vs. Wade (Kane and Staiger 1996; Levine et al. 1996). Abortion legalization may also hinder a
woman’s ability to withhold premarital sexual favors to men (Akerlof et al. 1996; Lott and Whitley 2007). Women
who are opposed to abortion would receive competition from women who are willing to obtain abortion as men “seek
satisfaction elsewhere” (Akerlof et al. 1996). Consistent with this theory, Lott and Whitley (2007) finds evidence that
abortion increases the number of out-of-wedlock births.
Both Levine et al. (1999) and Donohue and Levitt (2001) used the staggered abortion legalization across
states to determine the causal impact of changes in abortion law. Prior to the Supreme Court case of Roe vs. Wade
in 1973, a handful of states implemented reforms legalizing abortion for women in very special circumstances –
mental health, fetal deformity, or pregnancy by rape or incest (McBride 2008). The legislative history provided
previous researchers natural experiments in which states can be categorized by abortion legality in different years.
Several methodologies using this variation have been employed for literature on the impact of abortion. Gruber
et al. (1999) compared the outcomes of youths born in early repeal states relative to the other states. This “natural
experiment” has been criticized since the difference between birth rates in repeal and non-repeal states eventually
converged once abortion was legalized nationwide, while abortion rates continued to remain much higher in repeal
states than non-repeal states (Donohue and Levitt 2004). Instead, Donohue and Levitt (2001) regressed the arrest
rate by individuals’ state and birth year against the abortion rate in the state and year that the individual was born.
However, this strategy has also generated controversy. In particular, Joyce (2004; 2009) has argued that abortion
rate should not appear on the right hand side of the regression as it is endogenous.
Contemporary examples of appellate precedent illustrate how Circuit Courts continually provide new inter-
pretations or distinctions of pre-existing precedents that expand or contract the space of allowable state regulations.
A Mississippi statute would have shut down its sole abortion clinic by requiring its doctors to obtain admitting
privileges at local hospitals, but on July 2014, the Fifth Circuit required that the statute not be implemented while
substantive issues were considered further by a Federal District Court. In March 2014, the same Circuit Court upheld
a Texas law requiring the same admitting privileges, which resulted in one-third of abortion clinics in Texas shutting
down, forcing some women to drive more than 100 miles to obtain an abortion. The reason the Fifth Circuit could
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render identical state laws upheld in one state but delayed in another is that the court took into account the potential
consequences on abortion access for women living in the state. A subsequent Texas statute required abortion clinics
to meet the building standards of ambulatory surgery centers; this statute was allowed by the Fifth Circuit in the
Fall of 2014 while it considered the appeal to invalidate the new statute. If allowed, this statute would reduce the
number of centers operating in the state to fewer than 10.40 Finally, similar laws in some states have been temporarily
blocked by some Federal Courts, while they have taken effect in other states, which illustrates that precedents in one
Circuit need not be followed in other Circuits.
Several institutional features enable Circuit decisions to shape abortion law. First, the U.S. has a common
law system where judges both apply the law as well as make the law. This judicial lawmaking occurs as judges’
decisions in current cases become precedents that guide decisions in future cases within the jurisdiction. Second,
the Federal Courts system consists of three levels. Litigation, such as a lawsuit asserting that government-mandated
waiting periods for an abortion procedure are unenforceable, begin in the District Courts, which are the general trial
courts with juries that typically decide issues of fact. On appeal, cases go to Circuit Courts, which examine whether
the District Court was in error and typically decide issues of law ; they take facts as given from District Courts, have
no juries, and typically only hear cases presenting new legal issues. The 94 District Courts currently receive over
300,000 cases a year and the 12 Circuit Courts 60,000 cases a year, but the Supreme Court hears roughly 100 cases
a year. This feature means that Circuit judges create the vast majority of precedents that constitute the law. Also,
the random assignment of judges to a small legal topic is unlikely to be systematically related to the assignment in
another area of law.
Together, these features of the Federal Court system are important in creating random variation in abortion
precedents across regions of the U.S. and over time. Circuit Court decisions form abortion policy by setting legal
precedents that become the law of the Circuit and by affirming or invalidating government statutes, ordinances, and
regulations. Their injunctions can block enforcement of anti-abortion statutes, thereby ensuring access to abortions.
The randomness of the judicial assignment creates wide variation and uncertainty in outcomes even within the same
Circuit. Note that any spillovers whereby circuits are expected to follow other circuits (with some delay) would
suggest the true effect would be larger than what we estimate.
Between 1973-2006, 56% of individuals said Yes in response to “Should it be illegal for a woman to obtain
abortion because she does not want more children”, 55% said Yes for “Woman is single”, 60% says Yes for “Any
reason”, 17% said Yes for “Pregnancy is a result of rape”, 19% said Yes for “High chance of child’s defect”, and 10%
for “Mother’s health is endangered” (Appendix Table A.2). Appendix Figure A.1 presents variation in the abortion
attitude over time with an index–an average of answers to questions about the legality of abortions in different
circumstances). Some attitudes have shifted more than others. Forty years after Roe v. Wade, fewer people support
allowing abortions in the case of a serious birth defect or because the mother cannot afford more children or is
40http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/us/mississippi-abortion-clinic-Federal-court-blocks-closing.html
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unmarried; yet more people also support allowing abortions for any reason.
APPENDIX TABLE A.2
Summary Statistics for GSS Attitudes
mean sd min max count
GSS respondents
Age 45.276 17.498 18 89 44736
Female .563 .496 0 1 44897
Should it be illegal to have an abortion for a following reason:
Does not want more children .558 .497 0 1 31876
Mother’s health is endangered .099 .299 0 1 32182
Family is poor .521 .499 0 1 31825
Pregnancy is result of rape .174 .379 0 1 31812
Woman is single .553 .497 0 1 31807
Any reason .599 .490 0 1 26092
High chance of child’s defect .188 .391 0 1 32040
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Abortion attitudes over time
B Assessment of Random Assignment
According to interviews, each court implements randomization differently. In some Circuits, two to three
weeks before the oral argument, a computer program randomly assigns available judges to panels who will hear cases.
In other Circuits, judges are randomly assigned to panels up to a year in advance; cases that arise are randomly
assigned to panels. Some judges take a reduced caseload if retired or visiting, but all are randomly assigned by a
computer algorithm. Senior judges can opt out of death penalty cases in some Circuits, but they would do so before
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random assignment. Chen and Sethi (2016) formally tests for randomization by showing that case characteristics as
determined by District Courts are not correlated with the characteristics of the Courts of Appeals judges assigned to
the case. For more information about random assignment of cases at the Circuit level, see Brown Jr. and Lee (2000).
Even if judges are randomly assigned, because our data comprise published opinions, several additional
issues need to be considered: settlement, publication, and strategic use of keywords or citation. In Courts of Appeals,
judges are revealed very late, after litigants file their briefs, sometimes only a few days before the hearing, if there is
a hearing, which gives little opportunity and incentive for settlement upon learning the identity of the panel. Most
of the litigation costs are sunk by that point, and when the D.C. Circuit began announcing judges earlier, it did not
affect settlement rates (Jordan 2007). Unpublished cases are not supposed to have precedential value. Unpublished
cases are deemed as routine and easy: studies find that judicial ideology predicts neither the decision in unpublished
cases (Keele et al. 2009) nor the decision to publish (Merritt and Brudney 2001). Appendix Figures B.1 and B.2
indicate that panel composition does not appear to be serially correlated. The connected blue dots represent the
expected number of Democrats per seat calculated using the composition of the Circuit pool of judges available to
be assigned, while the unconnected red dots represent the actual number of Democrats per seat on abortion cases.
Appendix Figure B.1.— Judicial Composition and Random Assignment, 1971-2004
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Random Variation by Circuit: Democrat
Omnibus tests can formally address these potential deviations from strict exogeneity. First, we examine lead
coefficients to check whether our instrumental variables are endogenous to pre-existing trends. Second, we stack the
strings across Circuits and across biographical characteristics and run an autocorrelation test and compare the F
statistic with F statistics generated from randomly assigning available judges to cases. The results are displayed in
Appendix Figure B.3. The empirical F is ranked in the middle of the distribution of the simulated F statistics.
Third, we also confirm that contemporaneous judicial composition is not correlated with abortion decisions
in the “wrong year” in the Circuit. The association between current year’s decisions with biographical characteristics
for cases in a different year is substantially smaller or even of the wrong sign. The joint F test and R-square fall
sharply. These tests support the hypothesis that judge assignments are not serially correlated over time in violation
of our research design.
In Appendix Table B.1, Column 1 repeats Column 8 from Table I for comparability. Column 2 reports
the association between the current year’s decisions with biographical characteristics in the previous year’s cases.
Column 3 reports the association between the current year’s decisions and the biographical characteristics in cases
two years ago. Columns 4 and 5 do the same for cases in the following year and two years from the current year.
These tests support the hypothesis that judge assignment in published cases is not serially correlated over time and
that subsequent published cases are not simply reflecting the exact precedent in the cases from the previous two
years.
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Appendix Figure B.3.— Randomization Check: F-statistics for autocorrelation coefficient
APPENDIX TABLE B.1
Falsification Test of Instruments: Relationship between Pro-Choice Abortion Decisions and
Composition of Abortion Panels in Previous and Subsequent Years.





Repub. X Non-white -1.261∗
(0.422)






Repub. X Non-white (-1) -0.314
(0.392)






Repub. X Non-white (-2) -0.352
(0.246)






Repub. X Non-white (+1) -0.474+
(0.261)






Repub. X Non-white (+2) 1.345
(0.923)
In-state BA X Black (+2) 0.160
(0.855)
N 44897 44897 44897 42085 42085
R-sq 0.674 0.257 0.268 0.295 0.322
Joint F-test 16.26 6.912 1.962 2.572 4.916
Controls All All All All All
CY with no cases Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied Dummied
Independent variable is share of Pro-Choice decisions. Regressors include the fraction of judicial panels
comprising certain biographical characteristics, expected fractions of these characteristics, and dummy
indicators for the presence of a case, Circuit, and Year. Standard errors clustered at the Circuit-year level.
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Other variations from random assignment include: remanded cases from the Supreme Court are returned to
the original panel; en banc cases that are heard by the entire pool of judges (or a significant fraction in the Ninth
Circuit); judges with conflict of interests opt out after random assignment, which is extremely rare. We do not use
remanded or en banc cases, which are also relatively infrequent. Judges can also take sick leave or go on vacation,
but this is determined far in advance.
Our identification strategy assumes that idiosyncratic deviations from random assignment are ignorable.
Even a gold-standard random process — the roll of a die — has a deterministic element. If known with precision,
the force and torque applied to the die, the subtle air currents, the hardness of the surface, etc., might allow us (or a
physicist) to determine with certainty the outcome of these “random” rolls. Despite this obvious non-randomness, we
would still have faith in the outcome of a trial with treatment assignments based on die rolls because we are certain
that the factors affecting the assignment have no impact on the outcome of interest and hence are ignorable.
C District Courts
District Courts assign one judge to a case randomly or rotationally (Taha 2009; Bird 1975). Cases being
returned on remand from the Courts of Appeals are not randomly assigned. We do not use remanded cases in
our dataset. For example, one District told us that random assignment occurs within 24 hours of a case filing,
which is handled in the order of its arrival. Waldfogel (1995) reports that one District Court uses three separate
randomization wheels and each wheel corresponds to the anticipated case length. Related cases (meaning that one
decision will substantially resolve all cases), if filed within a few weeks, may be consolidated. Waldfogel (1995)
reports that plaintiffs can argue the case is related to another pending case and, if the judge agrees, the cases will
be consolidated. A clerk reported 8% of filed cases were accepted as related in 1991 in SDNY. In another District
Court, if a clerk identifies and two judges agree that a new civil case is related to another open civil case, they
will be consolidated in the interests of justice or judicial economy. The clerk brings the possible connection to the
attention of the judge of the new case, who then confers with the judge of the earlier case to determine whether they
are in fact related cases. Consolidation would only occur for relatively high-frequency case types. For the handful of
District cases that do overlap such that they are consolidated, we assume the decisions about case relatedness occur
in a manner exogenous to judge assignment.
Unlike for Courts of Appeals cases, we cannot use the random strings test as an omnibus assessment for
violations of random assignment, because some Districts use rotational assignment or random drawing of judges from
card decks without replacement. So we discuss the concerns qualitatively and suggest another empirical test. First,
District Courts judges are revealed much earlier than Courts of Appeals judges. Ideally, we would use docket filings
in the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, but judges are omitted for most cases prior to 2000, so we must use
published District opinions to construct our District IV. So, we buttress the assumption that settlement, publication,
and strategic use of keywords or citations are exogenous: 1) in District Courts, judges are much more constrained
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and ideology has been found to play hardly any role. Judicial ideology does not predict settlement rates (Ashenfelter
et al. 1995; Nielsen et al. 2010), settlement fees (Fitzpatrick 2010), publication choice (Taha 2004), or decisions in
published or unpublished cases (Keele et al. 2009)—this last fact is consistent with the District judge identity only
affecting outcomes through the presence of an appeal but not through the District Court decision, but this exclusion
restriction is not necessary for the primary counterfactual; 2) we examine these issues directly as follows.
Since the random strings test is ineffective for District Courts, we test whether District Court judicial
biographical characteristics in filed cases jointly predict publication. We link PACER filing data, which has judge
identity, to AOC data, which has information on publication. We obtained all freely available PACER (Public Access
to Court Electronic Records) data on District cases from 32 districts for 1980 to 2008 for a total of 359,595 non-
duplicated cases. This data contains the name of the District where the case was filed, the filing and termination date
(missing for 10% of cases), the assigned docket number, and the name of the District or magistrate judge presiding
on the case. We merge the names of the judges into the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AOC) database.
We use LASSO to select biographical characteristics and no characteristic was chosen. We assume that remaining
deviations from random assignment, like vacation days, are ignorable.
D Additional Results on Donations
Appendix Table D.1 reports robustness checks with alternative 2SLS specifications. Rows 1 and 5-7 repeat
previous results. These rows are labeled as “subsample” because only years with abortion cases are included. Rows
2-4 present models where years without abortion cases are included but a dummy indicator is included for the fact
that there were no abortion cases. Focusing on log of total pro-choice donations, the Naive 2SLS and LIML 2SLS
point estimates are very close. Rows 8-10 present models where the effect of pro-choice and pro-life decisions are
assumed to be opposite but equal in absolute value (β2 is approximately assumed to be 0) (i.e., specification 2). We
should expect β1 to be approximately half the size, and that does appear to be the case for the Naive and LIML
2SLS models.
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APPENDIX TABLE D.1





Pro-Life P-value N Pro-Choice P-value N Pro-Life P-value
OLS -0.102 0.167 0.0751 0.481 -0.0473 0.113 0.0780 0.842
Naive IV -0.235 0.105 0.245+ 0.0994 -0.0352 0.971 -0.368 0.499
LIML -0.119 0.194 0.128 0.168 -0.0246 0.919 0.0250 0.913
LASSO 0.0291 0.836 -0.226 0.586 0.253 0.376 -0.252 0.621
Naive (subsample) -0.240** 0.00655 0.144 0.296 0.332 0.766 0.0658 0.940
LIML (subsample) -0.153* 0.0132 -0.0209 0.796 -0.152 0.510 -0.0774 0.688
LASSO (subsample) -0.347 0.242 -0.688 0.148 -0.260 0.592 -0.932 0.200
Naive (-1/+1) -0.117 0.114 0.118 0.110 0.0260 0.958 -0.177 0.548
LIML (-1/+1) -0.0475 0.300 0.0482 0.318 0.0784 0.487 0.000788 0.994
LASSO (-1/+1) 0.0980 0.397 -0.0973 0.662 0.114 0.416 -0.124 0.633
N 26203 48117 596592 596592
Dependent variables are log of total donations to pro-life and pro-choice organizations as well as number of pro-life and pro-choice
donations aggregated to the contributor city level. Main independent variable is the percent of pro-choice abortion decisions in the
Circuit-year. First four rows are based on full sample and include control for presence of an appellate case in given Circuit-year. Rows
5-7 restrict sample to Circuit-years with at least one case. Rows 8-10 use recoded law which assigns a value of -1 to pro-life decisions
and +1 to pro-choice decisions and takes the average in a Circuit-year, assigning a 0 when there were no cases. Regressions control for
Circuit and year fixed effects. We also control for probabilities of being assigned a judge with these characteristics. Naive instruments
are shares of Democrats, Secular, and Non-White judges. LASSO instruments are shares of judges from the following groups:
Democrats, Secular, Non-White Republicans, and Black judges with an in-state BA degree. LIML uses the entire available instruments
set. P-values are based on standard errors clustered by Circuit-year.
Appendix Figure D.1 reports the Visual Hausman test for campaign donations.
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Appendix Figure D.1.— Alternative Estimates of Pro-Abortion vs. Anti-Abortion Precedent
on Campaign Donations
The yellow lines indicate the Naive 2SLS and the blue lines indicate the LIML estimates (which uses all
the biographical characteristics). The shaded gray area is the LIML confidence interval. The red dots
indicate alternative estimates using other biographical characteristics whose first stage F-statistics in
Circuit-year level regressions yield the top 50 F-statistics controlling for E(pct).
E Additional Results on Attitudes
E.1 Results by Abortion ReasonTo illustrate what Appendix Table E.1 implies for Democrats, focusing on
Naive IV for “Should it be illegal for a woman to obtain abortion because the family is poor?” shows that an
anti-abortion precedent causes them to increase pro-abortion attitudes by 8.7% relative to the counterfactual of no
precedent. However, for some discretionary reasons, like for any reason and desired fertility, Democrats also appear
to backlash to pro-abortion precedent.
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APPENDIX TABLE E.1
Impact of Pro-Abortion vs. No vs. Anti-Abortion Precedent on Abortion Attitudes
Republicans Democrats
OLS Naive IV LIML LASSO N OLS Naive IV LIML LASSO N
High chance of child’s defect 8237 12436
Law (Pro-choice) 0.024 0.056 0.016 0.008 0.030 0.027 0.014 0.029
P-value 0.292 0.417 0.521 0.851 0.112 0.609 0.566 0.402
Present -0.024 0.026 -0.019 0.039 -0.013 -0.024 -0.005 -0.010
P-value 0.164 0.617 0.287 0.412 0.361 0.559 0.794 0.794
Law + Present 0 0.081 -0.004 0.047 0.016 0.003 0.009 0.019
P-value 0.993 0.101 0.832 0.318 0.255 0.935 0.547 0.535
Does not want more children 8209 12384
Law (Pro-choice) 0.003 0.195* 0.005 0.120** 0.067** 0.031 0.076** 0.045
P-value 0.907 0.020 0.892 0.005 0.004 0.553 0.003 0.235
Present -0.019 -0.079 -0.019 -0.085 -0.017 -0.047 -0.022 -0.035
P-value 0.390 0.206 0.411 0.154 0.296 0.248 0.195 0.387
Law + Present -0.015 0.116+ -0.015 0.035 0.050** -0.016 0.054** 0.010
P-value 0.404 0.092 0.469 0.460 0.004 0.719 0.003 0.799
Woman is single 8176 12334
Law (Pro-choice) 0.024 0.183* 0.030 0.110* 0.053* 0.040 0.045+ 0.016
P-value 0.378 0.014 0.353 0.019 0.016 0.401 0.083 0.674
Present -0.025 -0.072 -0.028 -0.074 -0.023 -0.079+ -0.018 -0.069
P-value 0.210 0.251 0.209 0.231 0.143 0.067 0.260 0.115
Law + Present -0.001 0.111+ 0.001 0.036 0.030+ -0.039 0.026 -0.053
P-value 0.954 0.073 0.940 0.447 0.064 0.351 0.141 0.177
Family is poor 8194 12365
Law (Pro-choice) 0.028 0.166* 0.023 0.120** 0.036+ 0.041 0.030 0.004
P-value 0.286 0.034 0.460 0.005 0.058 0.427 0.164 0.900
Present -0.030 -0.064 -0.027 -0.085 -0.018 -0.087* -0.015 -0.062+
P-value 0.138 0.262 0.203 0.149 0.208 0.020 0.314 0.087
Law + Present -0.002 0.101 -0.004 0.035 0.018 -0.045 0.016 -0.058+
P-value 0.928 0.108 0.840 0.485 0.228 0.233 0.333 0.065
Mother’s health is endangered 8278 12493
Law (Pro-choice) 0.017 0.074 0.021 0.043+ 0.022+ 0.035 0.010 -0
P-value 0.277 0.112 0.264 0.071 0.091 0.385 0.503 0.995
Present -0.024+ -0.039 -0.026* -0.013 -0.007 0.005 -0.001 0.020
P-value 0.060 0.221 0.047 0.647 0.477 0.861 0.949 0.459
Law + Present -0.007 0.035 -0.005 0.030 0.015 0.040 0.010 0.020
P-value 0.610 0.379 0.714 0.284 0.167 0.185 0.372 0.407
Pregnancy is result of rape 8192 12337
Law (Pro-choice) 0.039+ 0.122+ 0.028 0.030 0.030* 0.011 0.016 -0.003
P-value 0.054 0.081 0.236 0.487 0.047 0.769 0.425 0.917
Present -0.047** -0.046 -0.041* -0.025 -0.010 -0.018 -0.002 -0.005
P-value 0.004 0.303 0.026 0.542 0.440 0.533 0.914 0.853
Law + Present -0.007 0.076 -0.012 0.005 0.021+ -0.007 0.014 -0.009
P-value 0.637 0.149 0.434 0.918 0.095 0.819 0.307 0.749
Any reason 6933 9933
Law (Pro-choice) 0.031 0.205* 0.036 0.117** 0.049* -0.062 0.058** -0.022
P-value 0.233 0.023 0.219 0.007 0.026 0.308 0.008 0.579
Present -0.010 -0.034 -0.012 -0.018 -0.001 0.010 -0.006 0.032
P-value 0.653 0.580 0.570 0.754 0.965 0.794 0.725 0.409
Law + Present 0.021 0.171* 0.024 0.099* 0.048** -0.051 0.052** 0.010
P-value 0.271 0.021 0.258 0.030 0.003 0.335 0.001 0.807
Table notes similar to that of Table VIII.
In separating the effects of pro-abortion and anti-abortion precedents, Appendix Table E.2 shows that pro-
abortion decisions cause Republicans to have more pro-abortion attitudes two years later. This is because β1 often
equals β1 + β2.
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APPENDIX TABLE E.2
Impact of Pro-Abortion vs. None vs. Anti-Abortion Precedent on Abortion Attitudes Two Years
Later
Republicans Democrats
OLS Naive IV LIML LASSO N OLS Naive IV LIML LASSO N
High chance of child’s defect 8237 12436
Law (Pro-choice) -0.008 -0.124* -0.010 -0.086** -0.002 0.026 0.019 0.042
P-value 0.727 0.046 0.726 0.008 0.930 0.644 0.465 0.289
Present 0.028 -0.012 0.029 -0.030 0.001 -0.019 -0.010 -0.026
P-value 0.158 0.787 0.176 0.453 0.925 0.603 0.595 0.510
Law + Present 0.020 -0.136** 0.019 -0.116** -0 0.007 0.009 0.016
P-value 0.198 0.010 0.290 0.003 0.986 0.901 0.548 0.738
Does not want more children 8209 12384
Law (Pro-choice) -0.016 -0.204** -0.035 -0.091* 0.008 -0.039 0.007 -0.018
P-value 0.582 0.010 0.350 0.024 0.681 0.561 0.785 0.609
Present 0.025 -0.060 0.036 -0.115* -0.018 -0.080* -0.018 -0.086
P-value 0.288 0.215 0.191 0.013 0.259 0.033 0.348 0.013
Law + Present 0.010 -0.265** 0.001 -0.206** -0.010 -0.119* -0.011 -0.104**
P-value 0.602 0 0.944 0 0.502 0.037 0.543 0.007
Woman is single 8176 12334
Law (Pro-choice) -0.033 -0.188* -0.028 -0.098* -0.008 0.006 -0.022 -0.035
P-value 0.238 0.025 0.421 0.010 0.691 0.916 0.366 0.307
Present 0.023 -0.058 0.021 -0.106* -0.020 -0.067* -0.012 -0.059+
P-value 0.325 0.253 0.444 0.020 0.189 0.032 0.487 0.074
Law + Present -0.010 -0.246** -0.008 -0.204** -0.027+ -0.061 -0.034+ -0.094*
P-value 0.604 0 0.708 0 0.084 0.232 0.054 0.016
Family is poor 8194 12365
Law (Pro-choice) -0.027 -0.216* -0.014 -0.103* 0.008 -0.068 0.010 -0.048
P-value 0.310 0.018 0.681 0.045 0.675 0.335 0.690 0.254
Present 0.016 -0.070 0.009 -0.121** -0.019 -0.062 -0.020 -0.074*
P-value 0.468 0.136 0.734 0.004 0.256 0.126 0.308 0.044
Law + Present -0.011 -0.286** -0.005 -0.224** -0.010 -0.129* -0.009 -0.122**
P-value 0.570 0 0.796 0 0.483 0.028 0.564 0.006
Mother’s health is endangered 8278 12493
Law (Pro-choice) -0.005 -0.112* -0.007 -0.073* -0.011 -0.016 -0.004 0.024
P-value 0.811 0.046 0.774 0.043 0.427 0.730 0.821 0.383
Present 0.013 0.011 0.014 -0.006 0.005 0.017 0.001 0.004
P-value 0.423 0.791 0.434 0.871 0.676 0.466 0.960 0.885
Law + Present 0.008 -0.100* 0.007 -0.079* -0.006 0.001 -0.003 0.029
P-value 0.546 0.027 0.623 0.037 0.495 0.975 0.752 0.295
Pregnancy is result of rape 8192 12337
Law (Pro-choice) -0.032 -0.097+ -0.017 -0.084 0.004 0.016 0.021 0.045
P-value 0.153 0.092 0.571 0.012 0.793 0.732 0.252 0.125
Present 0.024 -0.028 0.016 -0.058 0.002 -0.012 -0.008 -0.003
P-value 0.204 0.436 0.487 0.120 0.902 0.646 0.587 0.922
Law + Present -0.008 -0.126* -0.001 -0.142** 0.006 0.004 0.013 0.042
P-value 0.567 0.021 0.934 0.001 0.652 0.931 0.294 0.125
Any reason 6933 9933
Law (Pro-choice) -0.027 -0.205* -0.007 -0.069* 0.035+ 0.055 0.030 0.019
P-value 0.350 0.011 0.848 0.049 0.093 0.340 0.257 0.659
Present 0.029 -0.047 0.018 -0.106 -0.023 -0.060* -0.020 -0.044
P-value 0.224 0.321 0.542 0.017 0.143 0.033 0.265 0.106
Law + Present 0.002 -0.252** 0.010 -0.175** 0.012 -0.005 0.009 -0.026
P-value 0.915 0.001 0.615 0 0.484 0.922 0.605 0.564
Table notes similar to that of Table X.
E.2 Robustness of Backlash ResultAppendix Table E.3 display results of the second (Columns 2-4) and third
specification (Columns 8-10) described in the methodology section. Anderson-Rubin test statistics are also reported.
The significant impacts on Republican abortion attitudes reported in Appendix Table VIII all have Anderson-Rubin
test statistics between roughly 12 and 44. The inference that Republican abortion attitudes are elastic to abortion
decisions and which reasons respond to abortion decisions are robust across specifications.
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APPENDIX TABLE E.3
Impact of Pro-Abortion vs. Anti-Abortion Precedent on Abortion Attitudes
Republicans subsample
Full sample Restricted sample Law -1/+1
OLS Naive IV LIML LASSO Naive IV LIML LASSO Naive IV LIML LASSO N
Z-score index 0.049 0.267+ 0.048 0.132+ 0.456* 0.127* 0.176** 0.140* 0.022 0.107** 6317
P-value 0.317 0.053 0.391 0.067 0.016 0.023 0.009 0.037 0.440 0.004
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 10.877 . 16.572 24.953 . 20.925 10.763 . 6.716
Simple average index 0.021 0.124* 0.020 0.064+ 0.216* 0.056* 0.089** 0.065* 0.009 0.051** 6317
P-value 0.338 0.048 0.419 0.051 0.014 0.025 0.004 0.033 0.462 0.002
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 10.305 . 16.228 25.812 . 23.449 10.247 . 7.468
High chance of child’s defect 0.024 0.056 0.016 0.008 0.013 0.056* -0.028 0.032 0.007 0.036 8237
P-value 0.292 0.417 0.521 0.851 0.854 0.028 0.434 0.360 0.580 0.141
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 3.556 . 12.527 2.497 . 3.599 3.460 . 3.146
Does not want more children 0.003 0.195* 0.005 0.120** 0.379* 0.048 0.140** 0.100* 0.001 0.083** 8209
P-value 0.907 0.020 0.892 0.005 0.024 0.101 0.002 0.016 0.963 0
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 13.380 . 20.556 35.936 . 43.819 13.529 . 13.683
Woman is single 0.024 0.183* 0.030 0.110* 0.326* 0.067* 0.164** 0.093* 0.014 0.085** 8176
P-value 0.378 0.014 0.353 0.019 0.015 0.031 0.002 0.011 0.399 0
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 11.425 . 21.814 25.534 . 34.728 11.411 . 11.976
Family is poor 0.028 0.166* 0.023 0.120** 0.249* 0.048+ 0.144** 0.083* 0.010 0.078** 8194
P-value 0.286 0.034 0.460 0.005 0.035 0.095 0.006 0.029 0.526 0.001
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 6.988 . 10.892 11.660 . 18.819 7.015 . 8.384
Mother’s health is endangered 0.017 0.074 0.021 0.043+ 0.077 0.029 0 0.038 0.009 0.007 8278
P-value 0.277 0.112 0.264 0.071 0.238 0.181 0.995 0.111 0.354 0.632
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 18.759 . 20.773 9.294 . 20.221 18.696 . 0.229
Pregnancy is result of rape 0.039+ 0.122+ 0.028 0.030 0.156+ 0.059** 0.007 0.061+ 0.012 0.029 8192
P-value 0.054 0.081 0.236 0.487 0.078 0.002 0.871 0.082 0.336 0.156
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 26.834 . 28.051 35.341 . 32.707 27.402 . 3.321
Any reason 0.031 0.205* 0.036 0.117** 0.305* 0.074** 0.167** 0.102* 0.018 0.091** 6933
P-value 0.233 0.023 0.219 0.007 0.016 0.005 0.001 0.017 0.207 0
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 11.584 . 24.931 21.345 . 33.237 12.630 . 21.472
Democrats subsample
Full sample Restricted sample Law -1/+1
OLS Naive IV LIML LASSO Naive IV LIML LASSO Naive IV LIML LASSO N
Z-score index 0.112** -0.002 0.116* 0.015 0.123 0.111* 0.048 -0.008 0.060* -0.031 9092
P-value 0.006 0.981 0.011 0.831 0.310 0.045 0.538 0.865 0.011 0.408
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 0.370 . 0.478 3.283 . 2.722 0.143 . 0.901
Simple average index 0.049** -0.003 0.052** 0.007 0.058 0.051* 0.023 -0.005 0.027** -0.014 9092
P-value 0.006 0.943 0.009 0.821 0.293 0.043 0.520 0.821 0.009 0.390
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 0.356 . 0.495 3.667 . 2.644 0.143 . 0.956
High chance of child’s defect 0.030 0.027 0.014 0.029 0.006 0.031 0.014 0.013 0.007 0.007 12436
P-value 0.112 0.609 0.566 0.402 0.930 0.140 0.681 0.627 0.546 0.627
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 0.255 . 0.693 0.619 . 4.456 0.240 . 0.240
Does not want more children 0.067** 0.031 0.076** 0.045 0.123 0.083* 0.043 0.012 0.040** -0.016 12384
P-value 0.004 0.553 0.003 0.235 0.164 0.020 0.474 0.645 0.002 0.516
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 0.592 . 5.350 5.466 . 5.172 0.397 . 1.165
Woman is single 0.053* 0.040 0.045+ 0.016 0.119 0.057+ 0.012 0.016 0.023+ -0.033+ 12334
P-value 0.016 0.401 0.083 0.674 0.208 0.064 0.826 0.497 0.082 0.081
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 1.937 . 3.531 3.928 . 1.182 2.105 . 3.209
Family is poor 0.036+ 0.041 0.030 0.004 0.136 0.031 -0.007 0.014 0.015 -0.034 12365
P-value 0.058 0.427 0.164 0.900 0.115 0.268 0.832 0.594 0.172 0.120
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 1.253 . 3.889 5.241 . 2.637 0.788 . 5.799
Mother’s health is endangered 0.022+ 0.035 0.010 -0 0.045 0.018 -0.015 0.019 0.006 -0.004 12493
P-value 0.091 0.385 0.503 0.995 0.435 0.186 0.684 0.363 0.458 0.791
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 2.268 . 3.822 2.609 . 9.030 2.597 . 2.491
Pregnancy is result of rape 0.030* 0.011 0.016 -0.003 0.046 0.029 0.002 0.005 0.009 -0.007 12337
P-value 0.047 0.769 0.425 0.917 0.344 0.125 0.944 0.802 0.384 0.631
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 0.476 . 1.500 2.942 . 3.909 0.495 . 0.221
Any reason 0.049* -0.062 0.058** -0.022 0.064 0.043 0.025 -0.032 0.032** -0.017 9933
P-value 0.026 0.308 0.008 0.579 0.455 0.146 0.603 0.303 0.006 0.420
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 1.511 . 0.637 6.179 . 5.930 1.609 . 0.861
Dependent variables are abortion attitudes recorded in GSS answers to questions related to whether the respondent believes abortion
for certain reasons should be illegal. Main independent variable is the percent of pro-choice abortion decisions in the Circuit-year. In
Columns 2-10, the law variable is instrumented with judicial characteristics, i.e. share of judges with given characteristic on abortion
panels. Regressions control for age and sex of the respondent and Circuit and year fixed effects. We also control for probabilities of
being assigned a judge with these characteristics. Naive instruments are shares of Democrats, Secular, and Non-white judges. LASSO
instruments are shares of judges from the following groups: Democrats, Secular, Non-white Republicans, and Black judges with an
in-state BA degree. LIML uses the entire available instruments set. First four columns are based on full sample and include control for
presence of an appellate case in given Circuit-year. Columns 5-7 restrict sample to Circuit-years with at least one case. Columns 8-10
use recoded law which assigns a value of -1 to pro-life decisions and +1 to pro-choice decisions and takes the average in a Circuit-year,
assigning a 0 when there were no cases. The top panel uses sample of GSS respondents who declare identification with the Republican
Party. The bottom panel uses respondents identifying with the Democrat Party. P-values are based on standard errors clustered by
Circuit-year. + Significant at 10%; * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%.
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Appendix Figure E.1 shows that abortion attitudes for Republicans consistently backlash against Circuit
Court decisions. Almost all alternative 2SLS estimates are positive for the z-score and simple average indices. The
impacts on the components of the indices are also robust as are the impacts on the discretionary abortions. Notably,
the LIML estimates are all smaller in absolute value than the extreme estimates.
Appendix Figure E.1.— Alternative Estimates of Pro-Abortion vs. Anti-Abortion on Repub-
lican Abortion Attitudes
Appendix Table E.4 yields the consistent inference that abortion attitudes are affected by β1Lawct when
instrumenting for β21[Mct > 0] with District Court judges. The effects are similar in magnitudes in all of the
outcomes that were previously shown to be significantly affected, i.e., among Republicans. However, estimates of
β1Lawct + β21[Mct > 0] and of β21[Mct > 0] are less precise.41
41To illustrate: For “Should it be illegal for a woman to obtain abortion for any reason?”, Republicans become 18%
more likely to oppose abortion in response to pro-choice precedent when the counterfactual is no precedent in
Column 4; For “Should it be illegal for a woman to obtain abortion because woman is single?”, Democrats become
significantly more pro-choice in response to pro-life decisions in Columns 6 and 8.
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APPENDIX TABLE E.4
Impact of Pro-Abortion vs. None vs. Anti-Abortion Precedent on on Abortion Attitudes with
District IVs
Republicans Democrats
OLS Naive IV LIML LASSO N OLS Naive IV LIML LASSO N
Z-score index 6317 9092
Law (Pro-choice) 0.049 0.206* 0.017 0.120+ 0.112** 0.081 0.135** 0.091
P-value 0.317 0.030 0.766 0.058 0.006 0.279 0.005 0.142
Present -0.065+ -0.290 -0.031 0.030 -0.036 -0.149 -0.034 -0.153
P-value 0.080 0.158 0.447 0.848 0.217 0.380 0.305 0.188
Law + Present -0.016 -0.083 -0.014 0.150 0.076* -0.068 0.101** -0.062
P-value 0.645 0.725 0.737 0.305 0.012 0.717 0.003 0.587
Simple average index 6317 9092
Law (Pro-choice) 0.021 0.096* 0.007 0.057* 0.049** 0.036 0.058** 0.041
P-value 0.338 0.023 0.799 0.043 0.006 0.271 0.007 0.134
Present -0.026 -0.134 -0.011 0.013 -0.016 -0.079 -0.013 -0.077
P-value 0.113 0.140 0.534 0.851 0.224 0.293 0.366 0.132
Law + Present -0.005 -0.038 -0.005 0.070 0.034* -0.042 0.044** -0.036
P-value 0.726 0.720 0.791 0.287 0.012 0.611 0.003 0.479
High chance of child’s defect 8237 12436
Law (Pro-choice) 0.024 0.066 0.006 0.025 0.030 -0.006 0.050* -0.001
P-value 0.292 0.181 0.807 0.496 0.112 0.891 0.019 0.971
Present -0.024 -0.034 -0.004 0.115 -0.013 0.141 -0.021 0.079
P-value 0.164 0.786 0.823 0.144 0.361 0.219 0.202 0.301
Law + Present 0 0.032 0.002 0.140+ 0.016 0.135 0.029+ 0.078
P-value 0.993 0.822 0.932 0.063 0.255 0.237 0.084 0.242
Does not want more children 8209 12384
Law (Pro-choice) 0.003 0.123* -0.004 0.077* 0.067** 0.064 0.072* 0.058
P-value 0.907 0.023 0.916 0.030 0.004 0.116 0.023 0.106
Present -0.019 -0.055 0 0.048 -0.017 -0.097 -0.009 -0.193**
P-value 0.390 0.693 0.993 0.593 0.296 0.407 0.675 0.006
Law + Present -0.015 0.068 -0.003 0.125 0.050** -0.033 0.063** -0.134+
P-value 0.404 0.674 0.884 0.168 0.004 0.793 0.006 0.070
Woman is single 8176 12334
Law (Pro-choice) 0.024 0.150** 0.031 0.091* 0.053* 0.062 0.055+ 0.030
P-value 0.378 0.004 0.341 0.011 0.016 0.119 0.065 0.444
Present -0.025 -0.056 -0.010 0.072 -0.023 -0.205* -0.015 -0.236**
P-value 0.210 0.710 0.653 0.424 0.143 0.044 0.479 0
Law + Present -0.001 0.094 0.021 0.163+ 0.030+ -0.143 0.040* -0.205**
P-value 0.954 0.585 0.361 0.066 0.064 0.182 0.046 0.003
Family is poor 8194 12365
Law (Pro-choice) 0.028 0.141** 0.004 0.099** 0.036+ 0.046 0.019 0.017
P-value 0.286 0.010 0.903 0.004 0.058 0.232 0.414 0.561
Present -0.030 -0.113 -0.015 -0.048 -0.018 -0.055 0.001 -0.139*
P-value 0.138 0.432 0.523 0.557 0.208 0.579 0.968 0.024
Law + Present -0.002 0.028 -0.011 0.051 0.018 -0.009 0.020 -0.122+
P-value 0.928 0.871 0.613 0.554 0.228 0.936 0.261 0.059
Mother’s health is endangered 8278 12493
Law (Pro-choice) 0.017 0.030 0.017 0.025 0.022+ 0.030 0.038* 0.002
P-value 0.277 0.340 0.393 0.224 0.091 0.344 0.012 0.943
Present -0.024+ 0.035 -0.021 -0.027 -0.007 0.072 -0.015 0.038
P-value 0.060 0.704 0.183 0.568 0.477 0.389 0.167 0.474
Law + Present -0.007 0.065 -0.004 -0.002 0.015 0.103 0.023+ 0.040
P-value 0.610 0.516 0.815 0.972 0.167 0.241 0.073 0.432
Pregnancy is result of rape 8192 12337
Law (Pro-choice) 0.039+ 0.093+ 0.018 0.029 0.030* 0.027 0.046* 0.007
P-value 0.054 0.095 0.409 0.441 0.047 0.358 0.032 0.775
Present -0.047** 0.071 -0.018 0.013 -0.010 -0.051 -0.014 -0.003
P-value 0.004 0.489 0.307 0.873 0.440 0.501 0.400 0.952
Law + Present -0.007 0.163 0 0.042 0.021+ -0.024 0.032* 0.004
P-value 0.637 0.134 0.999 0.610 0.095 0.764 0.034 0.946
Any reason 6933 9933
Law (Pro-choice) 0.031 0.146** 0.024 0.085* 0.049* -0.001 0.063* 0.028
P-value 0.233 0.008 0.423 0.016 0.026 0.986 0.012 0.415
Present -0.010 -0.087 0.005 0.103 -0.001 -0.085 0 -0.028
P-value 0.653 0.455 0.843 0.218 0.965 0.440 0.992 0.701
Law + Present 0.021 0.059 0.029 0.188* 0.048** -0.086 0.063** 0.001
P-value 0.271 0.674 0.191 0.023 0.003 0.479 0 0.993
Dependent variables are abortion attitudes recorded in GSS answers to questions related to whether the respondent believes abortion for certain reasons
should be illegal. Main independent variable is the percent of pro-choice abortion decisions in the Circuit-year. The law variable is instrumented in Columns
2-4 with judicial characteristics, i.e. share of judges with given characteristic on abortion panels. Regressions control for Circuit- and year fixed effects. We
also control for probabilities of being assigned a judge with these characteristics. Naive instruments are shares of Democrats, Secular, and Non-white judges.
LASSO instruments are shares of judges from the following groups: Democrats, Secular, Non-white Republicans, and Black judges with an in-state BA
degree. LIML uses the entire available instruments set. P-values are based on standard errors clustered by Circuit-year. + Significant at 10%; * Significant at
5%; ** Significant at 1%.
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E.3 Robustness of Persuasive EffectsColumns 5-7 repeat Table X for comparison. Analyses with the full
sample are in Columns 2-4.
F Data Entry Experiment
Because subjects are unaware of an on-going experiment, differential attrition may arise at the time treatment
is revealed (Reips 2001). We successfully minimize differential attrition through a commitment mechanism: in all
treatment conditions, workers first face an identical “lock-in” task before the treatment is revealed. For this, we ask
all workers to transcribe paragraphs from a Tagalog translation of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations as well as
English paragraphs of dictionary definitions. This task is sufficiently tedious that no one is likely to do it “for fun,”
and it is sufficiently simple that all market participants can do the task.42
The payment for each paragraph is 10 cents with workers able to receive much more in bonuses, including
a 50-cent bonus for completing the survey from the GSS at the end. A paragraph takes about 100 seconds to enter
so the offered payment of 10 cents per paragraph is equivalent to $86.40 per day. At the time of the experiment, the
federal minimum wage in the Unites States was $58/day. In India, payment rate depends on the type of work done,
although the "floor" for data entry positions appears to be about $6.38/day.43 An example paragraph is displayed
on the first page of the external hosting site so workers are aware of the high payment before entering the study. In
fact, one worker emailed saying that 10 cents was too high and that the typical payment for this sort of data entry
was 3 cents per paragraph. After a lock-in task of three paragraphs, treatment is revealed. This lock-in successfully
reduces attrition and was first developed as a method for online experiments in Chen (2016).
The following are the treatments in our information experiment:
1 of 3 Lock-in Tasks: Kaya sa isip o diwa na tayo ay sa mga ito, excites ilang mga antas ng parehong
damdamin, sa proporsyon ng kasiglahan o dulness ng kuru-kuro.Ang labis na kung saan sila magbuntis sa kahirapan
ng mga wretches nakakaapekto sa partikular na bahagi sa kanilang mga sarili ng higit pa sa anumang iba pang; dahil
sa takot na arises mula sa kathang isip nila kung ano ang kani-kanilang mga sarili ay magtiis, kung sila ay talagang
ang wretches kanino sila ay naghahanap sa, at kung sa partikular na bahagi sa kanilang mga sarili ay talagang
apektado sa parehong miserable paraan. Ang tunay na puwersa ng mga kuru-kuro na ito ay sapat na, sa kanilang
mga masasaktin frame, upang gumawa ng na galis o hindi mapalagay damdam complained ng.
Treatment 1 (Anti-Abortion Decision): The Casey ruling upheld the right of states to regulate abor-
tions. The legislators had passed a law that restricted abortion by, among other things, requiring a mandatory
waiting period, state-written counseling, parental consent and husband notification. The Court of Appeals upheld
42Time and money are the most cited reasons for participation in Mechanical Turk (http://behind-the-enemy-
lines.blogspot.com/2008/03/mechanical-turk-demographics.html). Some workers do it out of need. A disabled for-
mer United States Army linguist became a Turk Worker for various reasons and in nine months he made four
thousand dollars (New York Times, March 25, 2007). Some drop out of college to pursue a full time career with
these disaggregated labor markets (Web Worker Daily, October 16, 2008, Interview with oDesk CEO). For more
information about the motivation and demographics of Mechanical Turk workers, see, e.g. Paolacci et al. (2010).
43Payscale, Salary Snapshot for Data Entry Operator Jobs, http://www.payscale.com/research/IN/Job=Data_Entry-
_Operator/Salary?, accessed June 17, 2011.
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APPENDIX TABLE E.5
Impact of Pro-Abortion vs. Anti-Abortion Precedent on Abortion Attitudes Two Years Later
(sensitivity analyses)
Republicans subsample
Full sample Restricted sample Law -1/+1
OLS Naive IV LIML LASSO Naive IV LIML LASSO Naive IV LIML LASSO N
Z-score index -0.050 -0.426* -0.038 -0.244** -0.333* -0.012 -0.028 -0.228** -0.012 -0.184** 6317
P-value 0.336 0.012 0.583 0.001 0.025 0.829 0.768 0.009 0.721 0.005
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 24.705 . 24.708 22.693 . 28.199 28.900 . 33.571
Simple average index -0.023 -0.188* -0.017 -0.103** -0.154* -0.006 -0.008 -0.101** -0.006 -0.080** 6317
P-value 0.329 0.012 0.578 0.001 0.021 0.811 0.836 0.009 0.704 0.006
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 25.088 . 24.475 23.547 . 30.407 29.916 . 34.413
High chance of child’s defect -0.008 -0.124* -0.010 -0.086** -0.068 0.003 -0.021 -0.069* -0.002 -0.071** 8237
P-value 0.727 0.046 0.726 0.008 0.241 0.881 0.628 0.032 0.893 0.001
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 9.516 . 11.220 2.504 . 1.845 11.311 . 22.527
Does not want more children -0.016 -0.204** -0.035 -0.091* -0.192* 0.018 -0.042 -0.115** -0.015 -0.083* 8209
P-value 0.582 0.010 0.350 0.024 0.016 0.573 0.377 0.008 0.428 0.035
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 21.032 . 17.853 17.416 . 18.445 25.731 . 26.863
Woman is single -0.033 -0.188* -0.028 -0.098** -0.199* -0.001 -0.039 -0.101* -0.013 -0.085** 8176
P-value 0.238 0.025 0.421 0.010 0.028 0.960 0.405 0.019 0.443 0.008
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 16.325 . 16.951 21.995 . 27.888 24.418 . 33.193
Family is poor -0.027 -0.216* -0.014 -0.103* -0.211** -0.010 -0.064+ -0.119* -0.007 -0.096* 8194
P-value 0.310 0.018 0.681 0.045 0.010 0.642 0.096 0.014 0.685 0.025
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 25.938 . 24.328 17.167 . 14.048 34.793 . 37.314
Mother’s health is endangered -0.005 -0.112* -0.007 -0.073* -0.039 0.017 -0.049 -0.061* -0.002 -0.052* 8278
P-value 0.811 0.046 0.774 0.043 0.436 0.405 0.112 0.036 0.862 0.027
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 10.525 . 8.299 1.027 . 3.323 12.542 . 11.509
Pregnancy is result of rape -0.032 -0.097+ -0.017 -0.084* -0.055 -0.015 -0.027 -0.053+ -0.007 -0.063** 8192
P-value 0.153 0.092 0.571 0.012 0.301 0.501 0.517 0.089 0.608 0.002
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 8.816 . 14.552 11.223 . 17.482 10.774 . 20.632
Any reason -0.027 -0.205* -0.007 -0.069* -0.206* 0.008 0.042 -0.109** -0.002 -0.058+ 6933
P-value 0.350 0.011 0.848 0.049 0.033 0.776 0.408 0.007 0.928 0.082
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 20.117 . 18.070 21.114 . 35.321 24.618 . 28.076
Democrats subsample
Full sample Restricted sample Law -1/+1
OLS Naive IV LIML LASSO Naive IV LIML LASSO Naive IV LIML LASSO N
Z-score index 0.017 -0.058 0.022 -0.010 -0.071 0.036 -0.122* -0.019 0.009 -0.003 9092
P-value 0.654 0.653 0.634 0.878 0.509 0.416 0.035 0.787 0.676 0.942
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 10.024 . 10.344 7.913 . 38.669 11.577 . 7.724
Simple average index 0.009 -0.030 0.011 -0.012 -0.039 0.015 -0.062* -0.011 0.005 -0.007 9092
P-value 0.592 0.600 0.597 0.682 0.391 0.426 0.012 0.726 0.642 0.731
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 10.941 . 11.263 8.922 . 46.029 12.826 . 8.295
High chance of child’s defect -0.002 0.026 0.019 0.042 0.005 0.020 -0.008 0.023 0.009 0.025 12436
P-value 0.930 0.644 0.465 0.289 0.943 0.366 0.853 0.457 0.458 0.317
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 9.070 . 12.308 7.809 . 12.947 9 . 9.759
Does not want more children 0.008 -0.039 0.007 -0.018 -0.110+ 0.010 -0.099** -0.021 0.001 -0.020 12384
P-value 0.681 0.561 0.785 0.609 0.070 0.631 0.003 0.591 0.914 0.383
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 11.337 . 11.265 12.236 . 26.714 13.847 . 5.447
Woman is single -0.008 0.006 -0.022 -0.035 -0.062 -0.007 -0.110** 0.002 -0.015 -0.023 12334
P-value 0.691 0.916 0.366 0.307 0.264 0.711 0 0.959 0.225 0.265
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 6.224 . 10.263 6.080 . 49.891 6.998 . 2.274
Family is poor 0.008 -0.068 0.010 -0.048 -0.081 0.019 -0.103** -0.033 0.003 -0.035 12365
P-value 0.675 0.335 0.690 0.254 0.192 0.382 0.006 0.424 0.814 0.248
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 7.694 . 10.122 5.034 . 26.333 11.596 . 12.550
Mother’s health is endangered -0.011 -0.016 -0.004 0.024 0.012 -0.001 0.014 -0.001 -0.002 0.028+ 12493
P-value 0.427 0.730 0.821 0.383 0.825 0.941 0.630 0.948 0.799 0.094
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 4.022 . 6.058 3.909 . 3.773 2.718 . 4.630
Pregnancy is result of rape 0.004 0.016 0.021 0.045 0.040 0.019 0.011 0.016 0.011 0.034* 12337
P-value 0.793 0.732 0.252 0.125 0.483 0.278 0.716 0.530 0.230 0.044
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 6.361 . 9.737 7.981 . 11.463 6.358 . 6.017
Any reason 0.035+ 0.055 0.030 0.019 -0.005 0.038+ -0.050 0.033 0.014 0.008 9933
P-value 0.093 0.340 0.257 0.659 0.911 0.077 0.118 0.277 0.280 0.762
Anderson-Rubin Stat . 5.868 . 5.437 4.583 . 14.068 7.038 . 2.262
Dependent variables are abortion attitudes recorded in GSS answers to questions related to whether the respondent believes abortion for certain reasons
should be illegal. Main independent variable is the percent of pro-choice abortion decisions in the Circuit-year. In Columns 2-10, the law variable is
instrumented with judicial characteristics, i.e. share of judges with given characteristic on abortion panels. Regressions control for age and sex of the
respondent and Circuit- and year fixed effects. We also control for probabilities of being assigned a judge with these characteristics. Naive instruments are
shares of Democrats, Secular, and Non-white judges. LASSO instruments are shares of judges from the following groups: Democrats, Secular, Non-white
Republicans, and Black judges with an in-state BA degree. LIML uses the entire available instruments set. First four columns are based on full sample and
include control for presence of an appellate case in given Circuit-year. Columns 5-7 restrict sample to Circuit-years with at least one case. Columns 8-10 use
recoded law which assigns a value of -1 to pro-life decisions and +1 to pro-choice decisions and takes the average in a Circuit-year, assigning a 0 when there
were no cases. The top panel uses sample of GSS respondents who declare identification with the Republican Party. The bottom panel uses respondents
identifying with the Democrat Party. P-values are based on standard errors clustered by Circuit-year. + Significant at 10%; * Significant at 5%; **
Significant at 1%. 55
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2928175
every restriction except one. Abortion, they said, was no longer a fundamental constitutional right, but rather a
“limited fundamental right.” This “right,” in other words, could be limited by any law a legislature passed and a court
thought was “reasonable.”
Treatment 2 (Anti-Abortion Decision): The court upheld a law, considered the most restrictive in
the nation, that required women to consult with a doctor face-to-face at least 24 hours before getting an abortion,
except in certain cases of rape and incest. The law required doctors to provide specific information about the
procedure, risks, alternatives and social service programs, and hand out a booklet containing pictures of developing
fetuses. Furthermore, the material doctors distribute will be developed by the state Department of Health and Social
Services.
Treatment 3 (Pro-Abortion Decision): The court reviewed a Massachusetts law requiring parental
consent before abortions can be performed on minor girls. The court struck down a part of the law that required
any woman seeking an abortion to wait 24 hours after signing an informed consent form before having the abortion
procedure. The court also struck down the part of the law that required the consent form to contain a description of
the fetus.
Treatment 4 (Pro-Abortion Decision): Seven Missouri laws regulating abortion were challenged in a
class action lawsuit. The court declared all seven statutes unconstitutional, including a requirement that physicians
perform certain medical tests when there was reason to believe a fetus had reached at least 20 weeks of gestational
age. These tests, which included assessments of fetal weight and lung maturity, were designed to determine the
viability of an unborn child. The statute’s indicated that “[t]he life of each human being begins at conception” was
also struck down.
Treatment 5 (Control): The focus of art music was characterized by exploration of new rhythms, styles,
and sounds. Jazz evolved and became a significant genre of music over the course of the 20th century, and during
the second half of that century, rock music did the same. Jazz is an American musical art form that originated in
the beginning of the 20th century in African American communities in the Southern United States from a confluence
of African and European music traditions. The style’s West African pedigree is evident in its use of blue notes,
improvisation, polyrhythms, syncopation, and the swung note. From its early development until the present, jazz has
also incorporated music from 19th and 20th century American popular music. Jazz has, from its early 20th century
inception, spawned a variety of subgenres.
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